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THE NEW ORIGINALISM
AND THE USES OF HISTORY
Jack M. Balkin*
Central to the new originalism is the distinction between constitutional
interpretation and constitutional construction. Interpretation tries to
determine the Constitution’s original communicative content, while
construction builds out doctrines, institutions, and practices over time.
Most of the work of constitutional lawyers and judges is constitutional
construction.
The distinction between interpretation and construction has important
consequences for constitutional theory. In particular, it has important
consequences for longstanding debates about how lawyers use history and
should use history.
First, construction, not interpretation, is the central case of
constitutional argument, and most historical argument occurs in the
construction zone.
Second, although people often associate historical argument with
originalist argument, the actual practices of lawyers and judges
demonstrate that nonadoption history is as important as adoption history to
constitutional construction.
Third, there is no single modality of “historical argument.” Instead,
history is relevant to many different kinds of constitutional argument. One
important task of this Article is to rethink the familiar model of modalities
of argument offered by Philip Bobbitt and Richard Fallon; and to offer a
different version that better reflects the multiple ways that lawyers and
judges actually use history in constitutional argument.
Fourth, according to the new originalism, arguments about adoption
history can offer mandatory answers only with respect to questions of
interpretation; they cannot do so for questions of constitutional
construction. That is, new originalists accept an originalist model of
authority only with respect to questions of interpretation, not construction.
Yet new originalists, like most lawyers, often make appeals to adoption
history in constitutional construction. This raises the obvious question why
American judges and lawyers should use or accept arguments from
adoption history in constitutional construction and only sometimes find
* Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School. My
thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Randy Barnett, Dick Fallon, Sanford Levinson,
Tim Scanlon, Scott Shapiro, Reva Siegel, Larry Solum, and participants at the Harvard Law
and Philosophy Colloquium for comments on a previous draft.
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them persuasive. The originalist model of authority by itself cannot answer
this question.
Fifth, we can solve this puzzle by paying careful attention to how lawyers
and judges actually use adoption history. In constitutional construction,
“originalist” argument is not a single form of argument. It involves many
different kinds of argument, and it often appeals to ethos, tradition, or
“culture heroes”—honored authorities who are treated as objects of
respect, wisdom, and emulation.
In fact, in constitutional construction, arguments from adoption history
are often hybrid; they appeal to multiple modalities of argument
simultaneously. Most arguments about the Founding period usually also
make implicit appeals to one of three modes of argument: national ethos,
political tradition, or honored authority.
This hybrid nature gives arguments from adoption history their
distinctive character in constitutional construction. Despite the dominance
of original public meaning originalism in originalist theory, lawyers
actually use adoption history quite differently from the way that academic
theory prescribes.
Sixth, precisely because originalist arguments (in constitutional
construction) generally appeal to ethos and tradition, they will normally not
be persuasive unless the audience can plausibly accept the values of the
adopters as their own, or can recharacterize them so that they can plausibly
accept them as their own. When these values appear too alien or
irrelevant, lawyers generally avoid making originalist arguments. Thus,
lawyers do not feel an obligation to consult adoption history in every case;
and when they do, they do not accept the results of adoption history as
binding on them if there are other considerations.
Seventh, in constitutional construction, adoption history is a valuable
resource available to originalists and nonoriginalists alike. Indeed, once
they understand how originalist-style arguments actually operate in the
construction zone, nonoriginalists and living constitutionalists should have
no qualms about appealing to adoption history and making originalist
arguments.
Using such arguments does not undermine living
constitutionalist theories of construction in the least. Refusing to employ
adoption history serves no important theoretical principle and has no
significant rhetorical advantages; indeed, all it does is limit lawyers’ ability
to persuade their fellow citizens through calling on shared traditions and
invoking powerful symbols of cultural memory.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is by now a large literature on the proper use of history in
constitutional argument.1 Much of this literature concerns “adoption
history”: the history surrounding the adoption of the Constitution and its
subsequent amendments. This focus is hardly surprising given interpretive
debates about originalism in the last half century. But it also blinds us to
larger realities.
Most constitutional arguments in everyday legal practice do not employ
adoption history; they may discuss history from other periods and places, or
1. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996);
Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69
TEX. L. REV. 1001 (1991); Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of the Framers’ Intent, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403 (1996); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 213–17 (1980); Michael C. Dorf, A Nonoriginalist
Perspective on the Lessons of History, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351 (1996); Michael C.
Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original
Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765 (1997) [hereinafter Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive
Constitutional Theory]; Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and
Constitutional Justice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1611 (1997); Paul Finkelman, The Constitution
and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV.
349 (1989); Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J.
1725 (1996); Martin S. Flaherty, The Practice of Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1565 (1997)
[hereinafter Flaherty, Practice of Faith]; Mitchell Gordon, Adjusting the Rear-View Mirror:
Rethinking the Use of History in Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 475
(2006); Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683 (2012);
James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary
Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1986); Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to
History in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87 (1997); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the
Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119; Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—
and Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627 (1997); Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do
History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387 (2003); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1365 (1997); Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77 (1988); David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History:
Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, and the Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755 (2001);
Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Clio at the Bar: A Guide to Historical Method for Legists and
Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REV. 377 (1998); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism As a Political
Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006); H. Jefferson
Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985) [hereinafter Powell,
Original Understanding]; Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1587 (1997); John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193 (1993);
Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court’s Uses of
History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Usable Past, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 601 (1995); Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609
(2008); Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law, 71
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 918 (1996) [hereinafter Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal
Scholarship]; Mark Tushnet, The Concept of Tradition in Constitutional Historiography, 29
WM. & MARY L. REV. 93 (1987); G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional
Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002); William M. Wiecek, Clio As Hostage: The United
States Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 227 (1988); Paul
Horwitz, The Past, Tense: The History of Crisis—and the Crisis of History—in
Constitutional Theory, 61 ALB. L. REV. 459 (1997) (reviewing KALMAN, supra); Joshua
Stein, Note, Historians Before the Bench: Friends of the Court, Foes of Originalism, 25
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 359 (2013).
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not at all. Even when lawyers do use adoption history, they do not always
use it in ways that the originalist model of authority presumes. Sometimes
lawyers treat the adopters as having special insight into the application of
the Constitution, but merely as persuasive or honored authority, not as
binding authority. Sometimes they treat the adopters as important figures in
the development of the American political tradition, not because we must
follow their views, but in order to understand the historical context of the
constitutional questions we face today. And sometimes lawyers view the
adopters as presenting negative examples or outmoded conceptions that we
should not follow today. The originalist model of authority does not
explain these practices of argument. To understand them, we must look
elsewhere.
The rise of the new originalism offers a fresh opportunity to think about
how constitutional lawyers use, and should use, history. In this Article, I
focus on my own version of new originalism, which I call framework
originalism, and which is developed in my recent book, Living
Originalism.2 As its name implies, framework originalism argues that the
Constitution creates a basic framework or plan for politics that is not
complete at the outset but must be filled out by later generations.
A. Framework Originalism
Like other new originalisms, framework originalism divides the practice
of constitutional interpretation into two different activities.3 The first,
which we might call “interpretation as ascertainment of meaning” or
“interpretation proper,” is aimed at figuring out the original meaning of the
Constitution’s words, including the original semantic meaning of the text,
any generally recognized legal terms of art, and any inferences from
background context necessary to understand the text. In most cases, the
Constitution’s words mean today what they meant at the time of adoption,
but there are a few exceptions, and we want to be sure that we do not
unwittingly engage in a pun or a play on words.4
Through their choice of legal norms—rules, standards, or principles—
written constitutions create an economy of constraint and delegation with
respect to future generations. Therefore, it matters whether the Constitution
uses hard-wired rules, which leave relatively little discretion for practical
reasoning by later generations, or standards or principles, which require
considerable practical reasoning to apply, and therefore delegate
comparatively more to future generations to develop and work out over
time.
When the Constitution is silent, or when it uses vague language,
standards, or principles, an inquiry into original meaning will not be
2. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
3. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 453, 455–58 (2013) (explaining that the distinction between interpretation and
construction is characteristic of the new originalism).
4. Jack M. Balkin, Must We Be Faithful to Original Meaning?, 7 JERUSALEM REV.
LEGAL STUD. 57, 61 (2013).
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sufficient to decide most contested questions. Hence there is a second
activity of constitutional interpretation, called constitutional construction.
Constitutional construction builds out the “Constitution-in-practice,”
fleshing out and implementing vague and abstract language through
doctrine, and creating institutions to further constitutional values. All three
branches of government engage in constitutional construction, responding
to each other and to continuous waves of social and political mobilizations
in politics and civil society.5
Framework originalism argues that we must be faithful to the
Constitution’s original meaning, and to its choice of rules, standards, and
principles to constrain and delegate future constitutional construction.
Framework originalism has a “thin” theory of original meaning. “Original
meaning” refers to the original semantic meaning of the text, any generally
recognized legal terms of art, and any inferences from background context
necessary to make sense of the text.6 It thus leaves most important
constitutional controversies in what Lawrence Solum calls the “construction
zone.”7 These disputes cannot be resolved simply by consulting the basic
constitutional framework; they require building and implementing doctrines
and institutions. These tasks are the work of multiple generations; the
adopters only begin a transgenerational project of governance that others
must continue.
The processes of constitutional construction through politics and law are
living constitutionalism. The American Constitution is “living” in the sense
that the participants engage in constitutional construction in order to meet
the problems of their time, creating new constructions that may supplement,
displace, or reinterpret older ones. Living constitutionalism is not a distinct
theory of interpretation that gives advice to judges or that judges might
consciously follow.
Rather it is an account of the processes of
constitutional construction over time.8 That is why framework originalism
is both originalist and compatible with a living Constitution.9
By contrast, other originalists, especially conservative original meaning
originalists, have a “thick” conception of original meaning, which offers a
correspondingly narrower zone for construction.
Moreover, some
conservative original meaning originalists object to the very category of
constitutional construction; for them all constitutional issues are questions
of interpretation, and the Constitution’s original meaning settles—or at least
significantly bounds—most constitutional questions.10
5. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 5.
6. Balkin, supra note 4, at 77.
7. Solum, supra note 3, at 458, 469–72 (defining the “construction zone” as the domain
in which constitutional norms are underdetermined by the original public meaning).
8. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 23.
9. See id. at 3, 20–21.
10. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 13–15 (2012) (“[T]he supposed distinction between
interpretation and construction has never reflected the courts’ actual usage.”); John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 773 (2009)
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Most historical research and debate about adoption history concerns the
contemporary constructions that people around the time of adoption gave to
the Constitution’s words and phrases. It involves what I call “original
expected applications”—how the relevant adopters understood the
principles and purposes behind the Constitution, the cases and situations
that would be covered by the Constitution’s terms, and how the
Constitution’s words would apply to controversies of their day.11
Conservative originalists tend to create their thick conceptions of original
meaning from this type of history. That is why in practice their versions of
original meaning originalism often hew closely to original expected
applications even though the concepts of original meaning and original
expected applications are distinct.
A central claim of Living Originalism is that there are many different
meanings of “meaning”—including semantic meanings, inferences from
context, intentions, purposes, expectations, and cultural associations—and
that it is a mistake to assume that the act of adopting a constitution fixes all
of these meanings permanently into the law. Instead, what is fixed at the
time of adoption—and binding on later generations—is original meaning
(in the thin sense described above), and not the purposes, intentions,
expectations, psychological states, or cultural associations of the adopters.
Fidelity to original meaning does not require fidelity to original expected
applications.
B. The Originalist Model of Authority and Its Limits
Originalist theories of interpretation share a distinctive view of
constitutional authority. They argue that something—whether it is original
intention, original understanding, or original meaning—is fixed at the time
of adoption, and that the proper interpretation of the Constitution depends
on what was fixed at that point in time.12 I will call this the originalist
model of authority. History provides evidence of what is fixed at the time
of adoption, and the result of historical inquiry, when properly conducted, is
a legal norm that we must follow in the present if we want to continue to be
faithful to the Constitution. According to the originalist model of authority,
constitutional interpretations are legitimate to the extent that they are
consistent with what is fixed at the time of adoption; they are illegitimate to
the extent that they are not.
Originalists offer different theories for why we must follow what is fixed
at the time of adoption.13 A common explanation, however, is that the
(rejecting the distinction between interpretation and construction and arguing that using
original methods resolves almost every controversy). For a rebuttal to Scalia and Garner’s
historical claim, see Solum, supra note 3, at 483–88.
11. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 7; Balkin, supra note 4, at 70.
12. Solum, supra note 3, at 459–62 (describing the “Fixation Thesis” and “Constraint
Principle,” which all forms of originalism share).
13. Justice Scalia has argued that this approach helps to constrain judges. Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863–64 (1989) (noting that
“the main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution . . . is that the judges will
mistake their own predilections for the law,” and that “[o]riginalism . . . establishes a

648

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

American people created the Constitution as an act of popular sovereignty
and the law they created must remain in force until it is altered or the people
create a new constitution.14 This argument combines elements of popular
sovereignty (for the initial creation of the law) and the rule of law (for why
the law should continue unchanged over time).
Once we introduce the distinction between interpretation and
construction, however, it becomes clear that the originalist model of
authority cannot explain why lawyers and judges make most of the
arguments from adoption history offered in American legal culture. To be
sure, the originalist model explains why we must always make arguments
about adoption history and why the best versions of these arguments are
always mandatory; but it does not explain why arguments from adoption
history could be merely persuasive authority, sometimes invoked and
sometimes ignored. It does not explain why lawyers do not always try to
make originalist arguments in every constitutional case and why judges do
not always accept them. Under the originalist model of authority, to
knowingly reject what was fixed at the time of adoption is illegitimate.
According to the new originalism, arguments about adoption history can
offer mandatory answers only with respect to questions of interpretation;
they cannot do so for questions of constitutional construction. Yet new
originalists, like most lawyers, often make appeals to adoption history in
constitutional construction.15 This raises the obvious question why
American judges and lawyers should use or accept arguments from
adoption history but only sometimes find them persuasive. The originalist
model of authority by itself cannot answer this question. This is the key
issue that the rise of the new originalism poses about the use of history. It
is the subject of this Article.
We can see this point through the example of framework originalism.
Framework originalism accepts an originalist model of authority with
respect to the content of the basic framework, but not with respect to
constitutional construction. Framework originalism argues that we should
interpret the Constitution according to its original meaning (in the thin
sense), which is fixed at the time of adoption. Thus, if we want to be
faithful to the Constitution, we must be faithful to original meaning. To the
extent that we need historical inquiry to clarify what is in the basic

historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge
himself”). But many contemporary originalists do not emphasize judicial restraint as the
primary justification for originalism. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 608 (2004) (“The new originalism is less likely to emphasize a
primary commitment to judicial restraint . . . . [and features] less emphasis on the capacity of
originalism to limit the discretion of the judge.”).
14. For examples of this kind of argument, see BALKIN, supra note 2, at 55; Balkin,
supra note 4, at 59; Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 411, 412 (2013) (“The New Originalism stands for the proposition that the meaning
of a written constitution should remain the same until it’s properly changed.”).
15. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 2, at 138–255 (using adoption history to argue for
constructions of the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment).
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framework, what history shows us is mandatory—mandatory, that is, if we
wish to continue to accept the Constitution as our basic law.16
Nevertheless, the basic framework does not settle most disputed
questions of constitutional interpretation; most disputed questions require
constitutional construction. There are many potential ways we might
construct the Constitution-in-practice. Therefore answering these disputed
questions must depend on other kinds of authority than the originalist
account. When we engage in constitutional construction, we are attempting
to persuade each other about the best way to build out and reform the
Constitution-in-practice over time. History will often be relevant to this
practice, but it will be relevant in different ways than the originalist model
of authority prescribes. People use history as a resource for construction,
not as a command. They employ many different kinds of history—not just
adoption history—and they use it in many different ways.
Originalists with a thick account of original meaning, by contrast, have a
narrower zone for construction or do not accept the concept at all. They
believe that history provides a very wide range of commands that we must
be faithful to today. The problem with a thick conception is that it cannot
account for a very large proportion of our current practices, including
practices that most Americans regard as valuable and would be reluctant to
abandon. Examples are the modern administrative and regulatory state,
modern conceptions of federal power, the national security state, and large
swaths of constitutional civil rights and civil liberties. Under thick accounts
of original meaning, Americans have not been faithful to the Constitution in
many ways, and for a very long time. Many if not most of the federal
protections and programs that citizens rely on today are unconstitutional.
Originalists with a thick theory of original meaning generally explain
current practices by arguing that longstanding precedents inconsistent with
(their thick account of) original meaning are an exception to the originalist
account of authority.17 They are illegitimate from the perspective of that
model, but we should retain them anyway because of reliance interests.
The problem is that the exceptions are so prevalent that they threaten to
swallow the rule. If original meaning is as thick as some conservative
originalists believe, most of contemporary constitutional practice will be
inconsistent with the originalist model of authority. Moreover, according to
this picture, much of modern constitutional law—for example,
constitutional guarantees of equality for women—must be deemed mistakes
that Americans are stuck with and must grudgingly accept rather than
valuable achievements that Americans should honor.
Perhaps equally important for purposes of this Article, in these areas of
the law most originalists reason from judicial precedents and other
16. See Balkin, supra note 4, at 60, 66 (arguing that fidelity to original meaning assumes
that Americans want to stick with the plan adopted in 1787 as subsequently amended
through Article V).
17. E.g., Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 129, 139–40 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997) (arguing for retaining nonoriginalist
precedents as a “pragmatic exception” in the interests of stability).
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modalities of argument in much the same way that nonoriginalists do. To
this extent, they treat these bodies of law as presenting questions of
constitutional construction, because they do not believe that adoption
history can be conclusive and sometimes must simply be ignored.18 To be
sure, originalists may want to move the law closer to what their interpretive
stance claims is actually correct, but in doing so they must always balance
the demands of their theory against other considerations. In and of itself,
the originalist model of authority does not explain why such a balance is
necessary, when it should be invoked, how it should be conducted, and the
relevant factors that this balancing should take into account. These issues
are left largely to the discretion of the individual jurist and the jurist’s
understanding of what is currently canonical and durable in existing
constitutional practices. As a result, there is wide room for differing
judgments.19
In Living Originalism, I argue that this is not a plausible account of
constitutional legitimacy.20 We can make much better sense of Americans’
actual practices of constitutional interpretation if we adopt the distinction
between interpretation and construction, and if we recognize that fidelity to
original meaning commits us only to a thin theory of original meaning. It
follows that the originalist model of authority applies only to the basic
framework. The rest is constitutional construction, which features many
different kinds of arguments.
C. The Consequences of the Interpretation-Construction Distinction
for Historical Argument
One does not have to agree with my theory of framework originalism in
all respects in order to accept the analysis in this Article. The only idea that
one has to accept is the distinction between interpretation and construction.
This idea has far-reaching consequences for constitutional theory generally;
in this Article, I show how it has four important consequences for how
lawyers use and should use history:
1. Construction, not interpretation, is the central case of constitutional
argument, and most historical argument occurs in the construction zone.
When we ask how lawyers use and should use history, we are primarily
asking about the role of history in constitutional construction. In
constitutional construction, history is a resource for persuasion, but not a
18. Some originalists allow the practical meaning of some parts of the Constitution to
change as a result of longstanding traditions, customs, and political conventions. See, e.g.,
Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1127, 1128 (1998) (arguing for originalism tempered by tradition and judicial restraint).
They also treat these parts of the Constitution as raising questions of constitutional
construction because they are interested in the meaning and practical application of tradition,
custom, and convention. See generally id.
19. Part VIII, infra, points out that the processes of living constitutionalism shape the
potential for originalist arguments in constitutional construction. Originalists are always
working within these processes even when they claim to oppose them.
20. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 8–13 (arguing that this approach confuses constitutional
mistakes with constitutional achievements).
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command. To be sure, there will still be need for historical work about
original semantic meaning and generally recognized terms of art. But the
vast majority of historical research and debate about adoption history is not
about these questions; it concerns contemporary constructions of words and
phrases and original expected applications. Although we are not bound by
these constructions, we might nevertheless choose to adopt some of them or
modify them for present purposes. We should be interested in history—and
adoption history—because it helps us craft and argue for constitutional
constructions appropriate for our own time.
Moreover, there is more than one way to use adoption history in
constitutional construction. We might want to adopt the constructions of
the adopters for a variety of reasons that I will describe later in this Article.
We might also want to employ the adopters’ constructions at a different
level of generality or abstraction, or modify them in light of subsequent
experience, changed understandings, or changed factual circumstances. We
might not want to accept the adopters’ views, but rather seek to understand
how their assumptions shaped the subsequent history of constitutional and
political development. And we might want to reject their constructions as
outmoded or as negative examples that we should not follow today. None
of these uses of adoption history corresponds to the originalist model of
authority. Even when we accept the adopters’ constructions, we do so
because we believe it is the most appropriate choice for us today, and not
because these constructions are mandatory.
These uses of adoption history are inevitably practical and presentist.
We look to the past in order to help us solve present-day problems. That
does not mean that we should deliberately embrace anachronism. We
should want to understand the past carefully and on its own terms. But
having done so, we must still go on to ask how the past can be useful to
constitutional construction in the present.
2. Nonadoption history is as important as adoption history to
constitutional construction. Many different kinds of history are relevant to
constitutional construction, not just the history of the adoption of the
Constitution and its subsequent amendments. Debates over originalism
have dominated the literature on history and constitutional interpretation.
Yet the ways that lawyers use adoption history are not all that different
from the ways they use nonadoption history in making constitutional
arguments and constitutional constructions. In both cases, there are a wide
variety of different uses of history, which depend on different kinds of
claims of authority.
3. There is no single modality of “historical argument.” Instead, history
is relevant to many different forms of constitutional argument. The
originalist model of authority maintains that the history of adoption,
correctly understood, reveals binding commands on later generations. But
this is not how lawyers generally use history. They invoke history in
multiple ways and in the service of multiple methods or styles of
justification. These methods of justification correspond to the standard
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forms (modalities) of legal argument. Examples are arguments about
structure, consequences, convention, and precedent.
When the constitutional text is vague or ambiguous, no single mode of
argument consistently trumps all others. This is yet another way of noting
that, in constitutional construction, history is a resource, not a command. It
is a resource in three senses. First, lawyers use history to support
arguments from each and every modality of argument. Rather than a
distinct mode of argument, history is a resource for making arguments
within each modality. Second, how history is used and how it becomes
relevant depends on each modality’s underlying theory of justification.
Third, historical arguments within each modality are always defeasible
given sufficiently powerful countervailing considerations.
4. In constitutional construction, “originalist” argument is not a single
form of argument; it involves many different kinds of argument, and it often
appeals to ethos, tradition, or culture heroes. People may be tempted to
think of all arguments from adoption history as “originalist.” But not all
arguments from adoption history treat the Founders, Framers, and adopters
as worthy of emulation—they might view the Founders, Framers, and
adopters as negative examples. By “originalist” arguments I mean those
which treat the Founders, Framers, and adopters as positive examples that
we should emulate today. But even when we limit the class of arguments in
this way, originalist arguments do not always behave in the way that the
originalist model of authority assumes.
First, as noted above, originalist arguments do not always win; they are
often rejected due to other considerations; sometimes they are not even
offered at all.
Second, arguments from adoption history do not fall into a single
modality of argument that we might call “originalist” argument. Instead,
just like other arguments that use history, there are a variety of originalist
arguments, corresponding to different modalities of justification. Each
modality of argument may use adoption history in a different way.
Third, in constitutional construction, arguments from adoption history are
often hybrid; they appeal to multiple modalities of argument
simultaneously. Most arguments about the Founding period (but not
necessarily other periods of adoption history) usually also make implicit
appeals to one of three modes of argument: national ethos, political
tradition, or honored authority.21
21. Jamal Greene has argued that originalist argument is a species of ethical argument.
See Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 64, 82–88 (2009);
Greene, supra note 1, at 1697; see also McGowan, supra note 1, at 757–59, 825–35 (arguing
that regardless of theoretical commitments, the actual practices of original meaning
jurisprudence are often appeals to ethos); Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional
Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13, 29 (1990) (explaining that the claim that the
Framers speak for present generations “is neither more nor less than a characterization of the
national ethos”); Richard Primus, The Functions of Ethical Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE
ALSO 79, 80 (2009) (“[T]he deeper power of originalist argument sounds in the romance of
national identity.”). Michael Dorf has argued that originalist argument appeals either to
political traditions (which he calls “ancestral originalism”) or honored authorities (which he
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Fourth, this hybrid nature gives arguments from adoption history their
distinctive character in constitutional construction. Despite the dominance
of original public meaning originalism in academic theory, lawyers use
adoption history quite differently than the theory prescribes. Even when
lawyers say they are making arguments from “original meaning” they often
focus on the Founders’ and Framers’ purposes, goals, expectations, and
intentions. They continue to quote particular honored Founders, Framers,
and adopters, and texts like The Federalist, Madison’s notes, or
correspondence between famous Founders and Framers as evidence of this
form of “original meaning,” even though any contemporaneous speaker of
the English language should be an equally valid authority. In short, despite
the academic theory of original meaning originalism, lawyers continue to
treat particular members of the Founding generation differently than a
dictionary or concordance. They treat them as having special ethical
authority in constitutional argument.22
Moreover, although lawyers use adoption history to appeal to powerful
features of American cultural memory, originalist arguments are usually not
dispositive unless supported by other kinds of reasons. Precisely because
these arguments appeal to ethos and tradition, they will normally not be
persuasive unless the audience can plausibly accept the values of the
adopters as their own, or can recharacterize them so that they can plausibly
accept them as their own.23 When these values appear too alien or
irrelevant, lawyers generally avoid making originalist arguments. Thus,
lawyers do not feel an obligation to consult adoption history in every case;
and when they do, they do not accept the results of adoption history as
binding on them if there are other considerations.
It is a commonplace that lawyers use history to gain authority.24 But this
phenomenon actually refers to three different (albeit related) practices.
First, lawyers sometimes use history to argue about original meaning in the
thin sense: original semantic meanings, legal terms of art, and necessary
inferences from background context. In these cases, history offers evidence
of the basic framework, but it is a comparatively small proportion of
constitutional argument. Second, in constitutional construction, lawyers
routinely use history—including adoption history—to support a wide range
of different arguments that use different modes of justification. Third,
when lawyers make arguments from adoption history they usually also
invoke the ethical authority of the Founders, Framers, and adopters. Hence,

calls “heroic originalism”). Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional
Theory, supra note 1, at 1770, 1800–05.
22. See Greene, supra note 1, at 1697; McGowan, supra note 1, at 835–40.
23. See Post, supra note 21, at 29; Primus, supra note 21, at 80.
24. See, e.g., Kalman, supra note 1, at 103 (“[L]aw professors’ concentration on the
texts of the Founding reflected their search for continuity between past and present and their
attempt to imbue the past with prescriptive authority.”); id. at 114 (explaining that lawyers
use history “to confer authority and be dispositive—to foreclose choice and surrender
authority to the past”).
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most originalist argument is best understood as an argument from tradition
and from cultural memory.25
Because people living within a tradition treat it as constitutive of their
identities, they generally assume that what tradition teaches is an important
guide to how we should behave today. But people also disagree about how
to describe and characterize tradition, and the level of generality at which
we should understand and apply the teachings of the past; they also disagree
about what elements of tradition are living and still worthy of respect, and
what elements have been superseded or rejected. Originalist argument in
constitutional construction follows the same rhetorical patterns.
Since the 1980s, originalists have tried to argue that original intention,
original understanding, or original public meaning should be the touchstone
for legitimate constitutional interpretation, even if one must make
exceptions for precedents of long standing.26 When originalists fail to
make the interpretation-construction distinction, they risk confusing what is
mandatory with what is merely persuasive. Americans make originalist
arguments because they like to call on the nation’s longstanding traditions
and invoke the authority of its cultural heroes. But they do so selectively.
The danger for originalist theory is that it will attempt to leverage
persuasive authority into mandatory authority, and appeals to the past into
commands from the past.
Nonoriginalists and living constitutionalists who do not attend to the
interpretation-construction distinction may tend to make the same mistake
in the opposite direction. They reject the originalist theory of authority and
argue that we should not be bound by the dead hand of the past. This may
make them hesitant to offer originalist-style arguments because they fear
charges of hypocrisy. The interpretation-construction distinction helps
clarify why these fears are unfounded. Making originalist arguments in the
construction zone does not commit one to the originalist theory of authority
generally. Appeals to ethos, tradition, and honored authority—understood
as such—should be valuable and important features of American
constitutional culture for the nonoriginalist and the living constitutionalist.
Indeed, a living tradition of constitutionalism needs cultural memory and
the resources that go with it, even if the tradition constantly changes.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II notes that
although adoption history dominates discussions of the uses of history in
25. Note that when the question is one of constitutional interpretation—i.e., ascertaining
original meaning—reference to specific Founders, Framers, and adopters is theoretically
unnecessary. An adoption-era dictionary or a sample of contemporaneous writings would
serve just as well. Yet even when the question is semantic meaning or generally recognized
terms of art, lawyers may continue to offer linguistic examples from key Founders, Framers,
and adopters because they are especially honored authorities—not as experts on the English
language, but as key symbols of the American political tradition. See infra Part VII.C–D.
26. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights,
23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 823 (1986) (“I wish to demonstrate that original intent is the only
legitimate basis for constitutional decisionmaking.”); Scalia, supra note 13, at 854 (“The
principal theoretical defect of nonoriginalism . . . is its incompatibility with the very
principle that legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality.”).
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constitutional argument, this focus can distract us from larger issues about
the use of history. Part III revises the well-known account of “modalities”
of constitutional argument first offered by Philip Bobbitt and Richard
Fallon. It describes eleven different ways that lawyers make constitutional
arguments in American constitutional law, and points out that one can use
history to support each of them. How lawyers use history in constitutional
argument depends on background theories of valid constitutional argument,
which are often unstated. This means, among other things, that there is no
single modality called “historical argument,” and that appeals to adoption
history are just a special case of appeals to history generally.
Part IV uses the example of structural argument to show how lawyers
frequently use nonadoption history in constitutional argument. Part V
shows how different background theories of constitutional argument lead to
different accounts of the same historical events. Part VI describes three
important classes of arguments: arguments from national ethos, political
tradition, and honored authority. They use history in distinctive ways and
they undergird most arguments from adoption history.
Part VII builds on this analysis to show how lawyers use adoption history
in constitutional construction; it explains that many originalist arguments
involve complex appeals to ethos, tradition, and honored authority. This
account explains why lawyers and judges use and follow adoption history
only some of the time; it also explains lawyers’ and judges’ actual practices
of argument much better than most academic accounts of original meaning
originalism. Originalist arguments are part of the larger processes of
constitutional change rather than a criterion that stands outside them. The
practice of originalist argument by self-described “originalists” and living
constitutionalists is part of a complex political and cultural struggle over
American traditions and cultural memory.
Part VIII concludes that in constitutional construction, adoption history is
a valuable resource available to originalists and nonoriginalists alike.
Indeed, once they understand how originalist-style arguments actually
operate in the construction zone, nonoriginalists and living constitutionalists
should have no qualms about appealing to adoption history and making
originalist arguments. Using such arguments does not undermine living
constitutionalist theories of construction in the least. Refusing to employ
adoption history serves no important theoretical principle and has no
significant rhetorical advantages; indeed, all it does is limit lawyers’ ability
to persuade their fellow citizens through calling on shared traditions and
invoking powerful symbols of cultural memory.
II. FIGHTING ABOUT HISTORY ON ORIGINALIST TURF
Adoption history has dominated the scholarly debates about history in
constitutional argument.27 This is no doubt because many of these debates
have been, either directly or indirectly, about the merits of originalism. Yet
this focus has had a cost; it has diverted our attention from the vast realm of
27. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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history that is irrelevant to originalism. History is valuable and relevant for
the originalist model to the extent that it sheds light on those aspects of
adoption history that bestow authority on legal argument; it is less valuable
or relevant to the extent that it does not. Judged from the standpoint of the
originalist model of authority, all other uses of history, all other periods of
history, and, indeed, all of the other places on Earth where history occurred,
are of limited importance.
Yet most history—and indeed, most American history—is not adoption
history. The history of social mobilizations, political movements, and
institutional innovations that have dramatically changed America but have
not led to the ratification of a new constitutional amendment are, by
definition, not adoption history and may have little relevance to adoption
history. Examples might include the New Deal, the creation of the national
security state in the 1940s and 1950s, the civil rights revolution of the
1950s and 1960s, and the second wave of American feminism of the 1970s
that led to modern sex equality law (but did not achieve an Equal Rights
Amendment). These events may have had major impacts on how
Americans understand their Constitution today. But from the standpoint of
the originalist model of authority, these events are of little importance to
correct interpretation, because they did not lead to constitutional
amendments. Indeed, for some originalists, many of these events produced
departures from original meaning that must be explained, if at all, as
exceptions and mistakes that we retain not because of their fidelity to the
Constitution, but on the basis of stare decisis or reliance interests. In fact,
most of the twentieth century is pretty much useless to the originalist model
of authority, except as a negative example—it is the period when everything
went to hell in a handbasket. No less than eleven constitutional
amendments—or twelve, depending on how you count28—were adopted in
the twentieth century, but these amendments have played a very small role
in the great battles over constitutional interpretation that characterized the
twentieth century.29
Post-ratification history—the history of the understandings of and
struggles over constitutional norms after adoption—is also generally
irrelevant to the originalist model except where post-ratification history
might shed light on adoption history. Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion in
District of Columbia v. Heller30 looked to mid- and late nineteenth-century
sources to determine the public meaning of the Second Amendment in
1791.31 One can—and should—criticize Justice Scalia for his anachronistic

28. The Twenty-First Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment. The TwentySeventh Amendment, although sent to the states in 1789 with the rest of the Bill of Rights,
was not ratified until 1992.
29. See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1737–41,
1750 (2010) (observing that one can hardly understand the constitutional legacy of the
twentieth century and the enormous changes it produced from studying the text of the
amendments passed during that period).
30. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
31. See id. at 606–19.
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use of historical sources,32 but it is still anachronism in the service of
adoption history.
The practices of the Washington Administration immediately after
adoption of the Constitution are generally thought relevant to understanding
the original meaning of Article II.33 But the practices of the Roosevelt,
Truman, and Eisenhower Administrations—which did far more to shape the
actual presidency we have and the actual powers that contemporary
presidents enjoy34—are not relevant to the originalist model of authority.
Originalists are not alone in their focus on adoption history.
Nonoriginalists and living constitutionalists tend to agree that adoption
history is very important. They know that originalism is highly influential
in American legal culture, and so they often make their own appeals to
adoption history as the need arises. When they do, they sound pretty much
like originalists.
The focus on adoption history continues even when nonoriginalists
criticize originalism. Much of the literature on the uses of history in
constitutional argument concerns the kind of history that originalists care
about. It has featured critiques and arguments about how to interpret and
use adoption history. Living constitutionalists and historians both inside
and outside of the legal academy have argued that law professors should be
more sensitive to context and the complexities of history, and that lawyers
should try to integrate intellectual history and good professional standards
of historians. The irony, of course, is that for the most part these debates
over methodology are debates over adoption history—and especially the
Founding and the early years of the Republic.
Thus, even when nonoriginalists contest the uses of history, they tend to
do so on originalists’s turf—and about the kind of history that originalists
care about. In this way, they reinforce the idea that the kind of historical
research that is most relevant to constitutional interpretation is the kind of
research that sheds light on the history of adoption. In fact, when Philip
Bobbitt offered his famous list of constitutional styles of argument, he
defined “[h]istorical arguments” as those which “depend on a determination
of the original understanding of the constitutional provision to be
construed.”35
32. Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV.
145, 173–74 (2008) (criticizing Justice Scalia’s opinion for anachronism).
33. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012); LOGAN BEIRNE, BLOOD OF TYRANTS:
GEORGE WASHINGTON & THE FORGING OF THE PRESIDENCY (2013); STEVEN G. CALABRESI &
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON
TO BUSH (2008); Saikrishna Prakash, A Two-Front War, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 197, 212
(2007) (“Consider the Washington Administration, the most crucial administration because it
was closest in time to the Constitution’s creation and because its views best reflect the
Constitution’s original meaning.”); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The
Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 295–96 (2001) (using examples
from the Washington Administration to explain the Constitution’s original meaning).
34. See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013).
35. PHILIP C. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1982)
[hereinafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE]; see also PHILIP C. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
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III. HISTORY AND THE FORMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
Yet if we are interested in how history is and should be used in
constitutional argument, we should begin in a different place. Instead of
debating the merits of adoption history, we should instead focus on how
lawyers make constitutional arguments. And the best place to start is with
the recurrent forms of constitutional argument. Each form of argument
offers a different way of engaging in constitutional construction. And for
each form of argument there is a corresponding account or theory of why
that style of argument is valid in American constitutional culture.
A. Rethinking the Modalities of Constitutional Argument
Both Bobbitt and Richard Fallon have offered well-known catalogues of
the standard forms of constitutional argument that lawyers and judges
regularly employ. Bobbitt offers six forms: text, history, structure,
prudence (including consequences), precedent (including judicial decisions,
interbranch conventions, political tradition, and social custom), and ethos.36
Fallon offers five forms: text, historical intent, theory (including a wide
range of different justifications), precedent, and value (including moral
theory, political theory, and natural law).37
Bobbitt calls the recurrent forms of argument “modalities.” Drawing an
analogy with modal logic, Bobbitt argues that the modalities of argument
are “the ways in which legal propositions are characterized as true from a
constitutional point of view.”38 I prefer to restate Bobbitt’s idea in terms of
styles of justification. Each form of argument gives people reasons to
accept beliefs about the Constitution-in-practice as true. A modality of
argument—for example, an argument from structure or from purpose—
offers a distinctive way of claiming that an interpretation is valid and
correct. Different modalities of argument offer lawyers different ways to
show why people should accept or be guided by their interpretations of the
law.
Moreover, each style of argument presumes a theory of why arguments
of that type are valid. For example, arguments from structure assert that an

INTERPRETATION 13 (1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION] (“A[]
historical modality may be attributed to constitutional arguments that claim that the framers
and ratifiers [of a constitutional provision] intended, or did not intend . . . .”); id.
(“Historical, or ‘originalist’ approaches to construing the text . . . are distinctive in their
reference back to what a particular provision is thought to have meant to its ratifiers.”).
Similarly, Richard Fallon’s list of constitutional arguments refers to “[a]rguments of
historical intent,” which he identified with “the intent of the framers.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1189, 1244, 1254 (1987). Both Bobbitt and Fallon wrote at a time when the focus of
originalist theory was shifting from original intention and understanding to original meaning.
36. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 35, at 7–8; BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, supra note 35, at 12–13.
37. Fallon, supra note 35, at 1244–46, 1252–58.
38. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 35, at 12 (“[C]onstitutional
modalities [are] the ways in which legal propositions are characterized as true from a
constitutional point of view.”).
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interpretation is correct because it causes the various parts of the
Constitution to perform properly and in conjunction with each other, while
“[a]n interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the government
cannot be just.”39 Arguments from precedent are based on rule-of-law
values, arguments from consequences maintain that where the
Constitutional text is unclear, we should adopt the reading that is most just
or will produce the best consequences, and so on.
Bobbitt and Fallon do not distinguish between interpretation and
construction.40 But I believe that the idea of modalities of argument makes
the most sense as a theory about constitutional construction. In Living
Originalism, for example, I described Bobbitt’s list of modalities as a set of
tools that lawyers use in constitutional construction.41
In this Article, however, my focus is on how lawyers use history in
constitutional construction. That task requires some rethinking of Bobbitt’s
and Fallon’s categories.
I will offer a list of arguments different from either Bobbitt’s or Fallon’s,
because their accounts do not crisply distinguish between different theories
of justification. For example, Bobbitt’s category of “precedential”
argument lumps together appeals to judicial doctrine—which gain
particular authority from rule-of-law values—with arguments from political
settlements, interbranch conventions, social customs, and cultural traditions,
which rest on different kinds of justifications. Fallon offers a category of
arguments from “theory” which, as he recognizes, comprehends a wide
array of different and potentially incompatible justifications.42
For purposes of this Article, I will divide constitutional arguments into
eleven different modalities. They represent eleven different ways that
lawyers argue for constitutional constructions, and they presuppose eleven
different theories of justification.

39. James Madison, U.S. Representative, Speech on the Bank Bill (Feb. 2, 1791), in
LIBERTY AND ORDER: THE FIRST AMERICAN PARTY STRUGGLE 73 (Lance Banning ed., 2004),
available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=
875&chapter=63865&layout=html&Itemid=27.
The classic discussion of structural
argument is CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1969).
40. See Solum, supra note 3, at 481 (explaining that a pluralist model of multiple
modalities “collapses the interpretation-construction distinction”).
41. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 17, 46, 89, 129, 205, 256–57, 333, 341–42 (explaining that
interpreters should use all of the traditional modalities of constitutional argument); Jack M.
Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 824 (“In Living
Originalism, I argue that lawyers can and should use all of the traditional resources of
lawyers both in ascertaining original meaning and in creating constitutional constructions
that implement original meaning.”). Lawyers might use some of the same tools to resolve
ambiguities about original meaning when linguistic evidence runs out; these are also
questions of constitutional construction. See Solum, supra note 3, at 481 (arguing that all of
the modalities are relevant to constitutional construction, and that historical, textual, and
structural modalities are also especially relevant to constitutional interpretation).
42. Fallon, supra note 35, at 1200–02 (describing different types of arguments from
constitutional theory); cf. id. at 1204–09 (describing a wide range of different kinds of
philosophical theories that might generate arguments from value).
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A modality of constitutional argument might argue that an interpretation
(i.e., a construction) is correct because it:
1. elucidates the meaning of the text (arguments from text);
2. reveals the structural logic underlying the constitutional system
(arguments from structure);
3. reveals the underlying purposes or principles behind the Constitution
or some part of the Constitution (arguments from purpose);
4. resolves gaps or ambiguities by choosing the interpretation that is
the most just or that otherwise has the best consequences (arguments
from consequences);
5. shows how previous judicial precedents require a particular result
(arguments from precedent);
6. appeals to existing political settlements or conventions among
political actors (arguments from convention);
7. appeals to the people’s customs and lived experience (arguments
from custom);
8. appeals to natural law or natural rights (arguments from natural law);
9. appeals to important and widely honored values of Americans and
American political culture (arguments from national ethos);
10. appeals to American political traditions and to the meaning of
important events in American cultural memory (arguments from
political tradition); or
11. appeals to the values, beliefs, and examples of culture heroes in
American life (arguments from honored authority).
No doubt this list might be expanded or described differently. The point
of the classification is to clarify the different ways of justifying
interpretations—and thus using history—in constitutional argument.
Note two things about this list. First, there is no separate category of
“historical” arguments.
Second, there is no separate category of
“originalist” arguments. Any of the eleven modes of argument might
employ history—including adoption history.
Both Bobbitt’s and Fallon’s list of constitutional modalities featured a
separate category of historical arguments, and each limited historical
arguments to arguments from the original understanding or the intentions of
the Framers.43 Each, in effect, imagined “originalism” as a distinctive
mode of argument, and each associated historical argument with
originalism, and originalism with historical argument.
I believe this is unhelpful for two reasons. First, it overlooks the
possibility that lawyers might use history other than adoption history.
Second, it overlooks the fact that lawyers use history in many different
ways to buttress a wide variety of constitutional arguments. In fact, for
each modality of constitutional argument—text, structure, purpose,
consequences, and so on—there is a different way to use history. Based on

43. See supra note 35.

2013]

NEW ORIGINALISM AND USES OF HISTORY

661

the above list, it follows that lawyers can use history to make at least eleven
different styles of argument.
We can compare the two approaches using these two diagrams:
FIGURE 1: MODALITIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT

Bobbitt’s model of modalities of constitutional argument.

Note that in Bobbitt’s model historical argument is treated as a separate
modality, which concerns Framers’ intent or understanding. Arguments
from judicial precedent, tradition, political convention, and custom are
treated as a single type of argument.
FIGURE 2: HISTORICAL ARGUMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

A basic model of styles of argument in constitutional construction.

This model classifies arguments according to the different reasons why a
form of argument is valid. Note that there is no separate modality of
historical argument; instead history is available to support each style of
justification. Moreover, history is not limited to the Framers’ intentions,
meanings, or understandings; no distinction is made between adoption and
nonadoption history.
B. Text, Structure, Purpose, and Nonadoption History
An originalist might object: Aren’t several of the modalities listed
above—arguments from structure, purpose and text—inherently originalist
modes of argument? The answer is no. In the construction zone, each of
these modes of argument may appeal to adoption history but it need not.
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Take structural arguments as an example. Structural arguments concern
how the Constitution works or should work. They are also arguments about
how different parts of the Constitution should operate together, and thus
play their appropriate role in the larger system of government. Structural
arguments claim validity because a correct interpretation of the Constitution
should further, and not undermine, the proper functioning of its constituent
parts. But asking how the Constitution’s parts best perform their proper
functions and best work together is not the same thing as asking what the
Constitution’s adopters expected, intended, or meant.
Of course, if we want to understand how the Constitution should
function, it is surely helpful to consider the opinions of those who
participated in its design or its adoption. That is why many structural
arguments do appeal to original understanding and original expectations.
Nevertheless, the adopters might be mistaken. The 1787 Constitution was a
grand experiment; nothing quite like it had been attempted before, and
many of the adopters offered their opinions before the plan of government
actually went into operation. The adopters could only guess at how the
various parts would fit together, and, in some cases, their hopes—and their
fears—were widely off the mark. Often one only comes to understand how
a complicated machine or institution works best after one sees it in
operation for some period of time. For this purpose, nonadoption or
postadoption history may be more relevant.44
In addition, the Constitution has been continually amended. Later
amendments may alter structural operations and incentives in ways that the
original adopters could not have imagined (and might have actively
opposed). How layers of new provisions and institutions best work together
may only be understood after many years, because their interactive effects
may only become clear later on, through practice. The United States is still
coming to grips with the effects of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
federal judiciary, the Seventeenth Amendment on Congress, and the
Twenty-Second Amendment on the presidency.
Moreover, new institutions (for example, political parties, the
administrative state, a central bank, standing armies stationed around the
world) and new technologies of communication, transportation, and warfare
have grown up around the basic framework, altering the way that the
different parts of the Constitution and different actors in the constitutional
system interrelate. Because of institutional accretions and technological
changes, the best structural account of the Constitution might not
correspond to the views of the original adopters.

44. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 142, 261–63 (distinguishing between structural
arguments and arguments from original meaning and original intention); cf. Martin S.
Flaherty, Post-originalism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1107 (2001) (noting a distinctive form
of argument that looks to what succeeds or fails historically as opposed to what the original
designers expected would happen). Ironically, as Flaherty points out, some of the best
explanations for why structural argument is not originalist come from the Founding period
itself. Id. at 1107–08.
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Similar considerations apply to arguments from purpose. These
arguments claim validity because we should strive to interpret the
Constitution consistent with its point or purpose. Yet the purpose of a
constitutional provision, like the purpose of a statute, need not be the same
as the intentions of the persons who drafted or adopted it. To be sure,
arguments from purpose often quote adoption history because Americans
generally assume that the Founding generation had special insight into the
Constitution’s purposes. Yet the purposes of the Constitution—or parts of
the Constitution—might alter or expand given subsequent history. Today,
Americans generally believe that a central purpose of the U.S. Constitution
is the promotion of democracy. But our contemporary value of democracy
is far more egalitarian and participatory than the Founders’ vision of
republicanism or representative self-government. Many of the 1787
adopters distrusted democracy, believing it to be unstable and likely to
degenerate into dictatorship or anarchy. Similarly, people today may
understand the purposes of the First Amendment—including selfexpression, autonomy, and democratic participation—in different ways than
the generation of 1791. New purposes can be grafted onto the text that the
adopters did not dream of, or—in the case of participatory democracy—that
they might have actively opposed.
Arguments from the text often involve adoption history—especially
when the goal is elucidating original semantic meaning or generally
recognized terms of art. But many textual arguments do not depend on
what the adopters meant, believed, or intended. One example is intratextual
arguments, which compare and contrast the use of words in different parts
of the Constitution.45 A second and related example is textual arguments
that rest on assumptions about purpose, structure or consequences, which
need not correspond to the adopters’ expectations or intentions. A third
example is textual arguments that use familiar canons of statutory
interpretation. Such arguments may not be appeals to original meaning,
understanding, or intention. The adopters may not have known about some
or all of these canons, the content of the canons may have changed over
time, and new canons may have developed since the time of adoption.46
C. The Interdependence of History and the Forms
of Constitutional Argument
Constitutional argument, like legal argument generally, does not study
history for its own sake. Rather, law uses history for a purpose—to
establish interpretive authority according to some account of what makes a
45. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 789 (1999) (arguing
that intratextual argument is not an appeal to original meaning and is “distinct from standard
forms of argument based on history and original intent”).
46. Cf. William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 531, 542–43 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 10) (“[C]anons
‘valid’ in one era may become ‘invalid’ in the next.”); id. at 538, 543 (noting that Congress’s
assumptions about what canons are valid may change over time and differ from those of
judges).

664

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

constitutional argument valid and persuasive. For example, the originalist
theory of authority I mentioned at the beginning of this Article asserts that
current generations are bound by what was fixed at the time of adoption.
History is relevant because it shows us what was fixed. People who make
arguments from original meaning use history and study the historical record
against the background of this model of authority. They view history
through the lens of their task: discovering what meaning was fixed at the
time of adoption. History that does not elucidate this question is ignored or
treated as irrelevant, even though it may be quite relevant for other
purposes.
The same point applies in constitutional construction. Each modality of
argument is a distinct form of justification; each provides a different kind of
reason why people should accept or be guided by a particular reading of the
Constitution. And behind each modality is a theory or an account of why
that form of argument is or should be valid in American legal culture.
Because there are many ways of making valid constitutional arguments,
there are many different ways of using history and perspectives on history
in constitutional argument.
Lawyers and judges employ history against the background of a theory
(or modality) of constitutional argument, even (and especially) when the
theory (or modality) is not explicitly articulated. Thus, history usually
appears in legal arguments as an enthymeme—an argument with a
suppressed premise.47 That suppressed premise is the theory of argument
that justifies the use of history, or that makes the use of history salient and
relevant.
Thus, in constitutional argument, history and forms of justification are
interdependent. Legal argument often depends on historical claims;
conversely, what history is relevant to legal justification and how it is
relevant depends on the underlying form of justification one is invoking
(textual, structural, precedential, and so on).
History and forms of legal justification are related in a second way.
What people look for in history and what they see in history is shaped by
their background mode of justification: why a particular kind of
constitutional argument is valid, and the kinds of facts that would tend to
support or constitute this argument. In short, history supports different

47. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC AND COMPOSITION: COMMUNICATION FROM ANCIENT
TIMES TO THE INFORMATION AGE 223 (Theresa Enos ed., 1996) (“[E]nthymeme generally
refers to claims in arguments that are supported by probable premises assumed to be shared
by the audience.”). Laura Kalman has noted how lawyers use history as an enthymeme and
has criticized the ways that this leads to unreflective practice:
The enthymeme here seems designed to confer authority and be dispositive—to
foreclose choice and surrender authority to the past. In the context of
contemporary constitutional law, it may be a move from rhetorical to logical
syllogism, and perhaps from rhetoric to authoritarianism. It replaces interpreter
with author in a vain attempt to invest authority in author, rather than in
interpreter, and to bypass persuasion and interpretation.
Kalman, supra note 1, at 114. This Article responds to Kalman’s complaint by showing the
many different kinds of suppressed premises in historical argument.
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forms of legal argument, and different forms of legal argument provide or
impose a perspective on history.
In constitutional argument, the way that people imagine history, look for
things in history, deem historical evidence relevant or salient, and weigh
competing historical claims will depend on their background modes of
justification. For each different theory or style of legal argument, there will
be a corresponding way to use history to support that argument. There will
also be a corresponding lens or filter through which people perceive and
interpret the significance and relevance of historical events.
These two ideas are central to understanding how lawyers use history.
First, most historical arguments are enthymemes that suppress a theoretical
premise. Second, the lawyer’s use of history shapes the lawyer’s
perspective on history—the way that history is apprehended, understood as
relevant or irrelevant, interpreted, and argued over. These two ideas are just
opposite sides of the interdependence of history and forms of legal
argument.
A third point follows from the last two. Each mode of justification not
only shapes how history is used, it also provides ways of rebutting or
critiquing that use of history. As I will show in the next section, a lawyer or
judge who uses history to make a structural argument is subject to
distinctive forms of critique or rebuttal that stem from the way that
structural arguments work and the reasons why these arguments are treated
as valid and persuasive. That is why revealing the suppressed premise of
historical argument is so important to evaluating it. That is also why it is
important to distinguish interpretation and construction, and to delineate the
different forms of legal argument in the construction zone. Understanding
what kinds of historical arguments people make helps us better understand
their relative strengths and weaknesses.
It is hardly a surprise that constitutional lawyers employ history for
presentist purposes and to gain authority for their claims. But this does not
make professional standards of history irrelevant to legal argument, or
excuse lawyers from anachronisms and simplifications because they are
engaged in a different kind of activity than professional historians.48 For
each use of history that I describe in this Article, and for each associated
claim of authority, it always remains possible to criticize or rebut the
argument on the grounds that the argument simplifies or distorts history,
engages in anachronism, or simply gets the facts wrong. The fact that
history has uses for lawyers and is useful to them does not excuse bad
history. It does not excuse lawyers from striving to understand the past as

48. For arguments that legal uses of history may involve different criteria than those of
professional historians, see Sunstein, supra note 1, at 605 (“[T]he historically-minded lawyer
need not be thought to be doing a second-rate or debased version of what the professional
historians do well, but is working in a quite different tradition with overlapping but distinct
criteria.”), and Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, supra note 1, at 934–35 (“Lawoffice history is a legal practice, not a historical one. The criteria for evaluating it, for
determining what is a successful performance, must be drawn from legal practice rather than
from historical practice.”).
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best they can, or allow them to ignore the best work of professional
historians.49 Rather, the reason we should be concerned about the multiple
ways that lawyers employ history is that the theoretical premises that
bestow authority on history are often suppressed or elided in legal
argument. Bringing them to the surface helps us better understand how to
criticize and evaluate historical arguments on their own terms.
IV. STALKING NONADOPTION HISTORY IN THE WILD: THE EXAMPLE OF
STRUCTURAL ARGUMENT
My first example of how modalities of argument shape historical use
comes from Justice Robert Jackson’s famous opinion in the Steel Seizure
case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.50 In this example, Jackson
explains why Article II does not give the president inherent emergency
powers. Jackson begins by making ritual obeisance to “the forefathers,”51
and noting that they omitted adding such a power to the constitutional
text.52 But Jackson then goes on to reject the idea that the Court should
infer such powers through constitutional construction. Jackson points to the
experience of “many modern nations” with emergency powers53:
Germany, after the First World War, framed the Weimar Constitution,
designed to secure her liberties in the Western tradition. However, the
President of the Republic, without concurrence of the Reichstag, was
empowered temporarily to suspend any or all individual rights if public
safety and order were seriously disturbed or endangered. This proved a
temptation to every government, whatever its shade of opinion, and in 13
years suspension of rights was invoked on more than 250 occasions.
Finally, Hitler persuaded President Von Hindenberg to suspend all such
rights, and they were never restored.54

By contrast, Jackson points out,
The French Republic provided for a very different kind of emergency
government . . . . [, in which] emergency powers could not be assumed at
will by the Executive but could only be granted as a parliamentary
measure. And it did not, as in Germany, result in a suspension or
abrogation of law but was a legal institution governed by special legal
rules and terminable by parliamentary authority.
Great Britain also has fought both World Wars under a sort of
temporary dictatorship created by legislation. As Parliament is not bound
by written constitutional limitations, it established a crisis government
simply by delegation to its Ministers of a larger measure than usual of its
own unlimited power, which is exercised under its supervision by
49. See Flaherty, The Practice of Faith, supra note 1, at 1575–80 (arguing that lawyers
should strive to ensure that their historical work is consistent with the best available
professional historical scholarship of the day, even though the interpretations of professional
historians may change over time).
50. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
51. Id. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 650.
54. Id. at 651.
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Ministers whom it may dismiss. This has been called the “high-water
mark in the voluntary surrender of liberty,” but, as Churchill put it,
“Parliament stands custodian of these surrendered liberties, and its most
sacred duty will be to restore them in their fullness when victory has
crowned our exertions and our perseverance.” Thus, parliamentary
control made emergency powers compatible with freedom.55

Jackson summarizes the lessons of this history:
This contemporary foreign experience may be inconclusive as to the
wisdom of lodging emergency powers somewhere in a modern
government. But it suggests that emergency powers are consistent with
free government only when their control is lodged elsewhere than in the
Executive who exercises them. That is the safeguard that would be
nullified by our adoption of the “inherent powers” formula. Nothing in
my experience convinces me that such risks are warranted by any real
necessity, although such powers would, of course, be an executive
convenience.56

Jackson’s use of history is noteworthy in four respects. First, although he
begins with a bow to the Framers, his primary use of history is not aimed at
determining original meaning, original intentions, or original
understanding. He focuses on relatively recent history, not the history of
the late eighteenth century. And he is not even concerned with the history
of the United States. His examples come from Europe.
Second, when Jackson discusses the historical experiences of Germany,
France, and Great Britain, he does not invoke an originalist model of
authority. He is not claiming that his argument is correct because it reflects
the original meaning, understanding, or intentions of the Framers, which
would provide a legal command that is binding on Americans today.57
Rather, Jackson is making an argument from structure or consequences.
We should interpret the Constitution one way rather than another because it
avoids bad consequences (a consequentialist argument); or because it is
more consistent with important structural features of the Constitution that
secure liberty and self-rule (a structural argument).
Jackson uses
contemporary European history to make his points, but he could also have
drawn on a wide range of examples from around the world and from
different periods in history, including, for example, the dictatorships of
ancient Rome.58
Third, Jackson does not explicitly state or defend his theory of argument.
He does not say, “I am making an argument from structure or
consequences, and here are the reasons why you should accept these kinds
55. Id. at 651–52.
56. Id. at 652.
57. Indeed, he finds appeals to original understanding singularly unhelpful. See id. at
634 (“Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen
modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph
was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.”).
58. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its
Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1798, 1800–02, 1844, 1863, 1865 (2009)
(drawing structural lessons from the design of the Roman dictatorship).

668

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

of arguments.” Rather, he uses history unselfconsciously—he leaves the
background theory of argument unstated, and he simply assumes that his
audience accepts the validity of appeals to structure and consequences.
Jackson’s argument is an enthymeme. It suppresses a crucial premise—
namely, the theory of legal justification that underlies the history he
presents.
Fourth, once we clarify the background theory (or theories) of argument
implicit in Jackson’s argument, we can see exactly how a critic might
dispute or correct Jackson’s use of history. One could, for example, simply
dispute the legitimacy of constitutional appeals to structure or
consequences. More likely, one could accept the legitimacy of these
arguments but argue that Jackson’s historical examples are irrelevant
because they are too different from our American experience.
In the alternative, one might accept that the examples are relevant, but
dispute what the historical account tells us about structure and
consequences. Perhaps Jackson did not get the history of Weimar right.
Perhaps the constitutional provisions were not the real cause or the most
important cause of Germany’s slide into totalitarianism. Perhaps what
saved France and Great Britain from Germany’s fate was not legislative
control over emergency powers, but other features of French and British
political culture.
In short, once we recognize that we are using history to support a
particular kind of argument, we can bring to bear all of the tools of
historical analysis to support or undermine the argument. We can
complicate the history, resituate and recontextualize it, and add
counterexamples, counterinterpretations and counternarratives.
To understand what makes Jackson’s use of history good or bad,
competent or incompetent, we must first recover the suppressed premise in
his argument. We must understand how and why he is using history. This
is the point of the interpretation-construction distinction, and of classifying
constitutional arguments in terms of modalities of argument.
V. HOW MODALITY SHAPES HISTORY: THE EXAMPLE OF ARGUMENTS
FROM JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
The most familiar forms of argument in the federal courts are arguments
from judicial precedent. These arguments do not claim that interpretations
are correct because of what the adopters meant, thought, or understood.
Instead, arguments from precedent claim that an interpretation is correct
because of previous decisions by courts. Arguments from judicial
precedent derive their authority from rule of law values and from the
institutional practice of stare decisis.
Arguments from precedent frequently use history.
Precedent’s
distinctive claim to authority shapes what history is relevant and how it is
relevant. For example, arguments from judicial precedent may require
historical inquiry because particular judicial tests within doctrine may
depend on history. The U.S. Supreme Court’s current test for heightened
scrutiny of government classifications requires a showing that a group has
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been subject to a history of unjust discrimination.59 Therefore, arguments
that classifications affecting a particular group—homosexuals, for
example—should be subject to heightened scrutiny will depend on
historical evidence and argument.
Substantive due process jurisprudence is based in part on evolving
traditions of practice and the historical importance of a right. Satisfying
this doctrinal test may require considerable historical analysis. Equally
important, it may look at history differently than an inquiry into original
meaning, intentions, or understanding.
McDonald v. City of Chicago60 offers a good example. In a previous
case, District of Columbia v. Heller,61 the Court held that the Second
Amendment guaranteed a right to keep and bear arms in the home for
purposes of self-defense.62 The issue in McDonald was whether this
Second Amendment right applied to state and local governments through
the Fourteenth Amendment.63 The Court held that it did, but on the basis of
two different reasons that employed history in two different ways.64
Justice Clarence Thomas, concurring in the judgment, argued that the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause included the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.65 His
opinion offers evidence of what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended and the ratifiers expected.66
Justice Samuel Alito, writing for a four-justice plurality, canvasses much
of the same history as Justice Thomas.67 But his focus is quite different.
Justice Alito argues that given the Court’s current test for incorporation—as
shaped by previous precedents—Second Amendment rights should be
incorporated against the states.68 The central question, Justice Alito
explained, is “whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms
is incorporated in the concept of due process” in the Fourteenth

59. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 601–02 (1987); Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–
14 (1976) (per curiam); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683–84 (1973) (plurality
opinion).
60. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
61. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
62. Id. at 635.
63. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3027.
64. See id. at 3026.
65. Id. at 3063–66 (Thomas, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 3071–77. In general, Justice Thomas describes himself as an original meaning
originalist, but his account of original meaning is thick rather than thin, because he often
treats original expected applications as part of original meaning. See, e.g., Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410–11 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In my view, the history
of public education suggests that the First Amendment, as originally understood, does not
protect student speech in public schools.”); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S.
334, 358–59 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“We should seek the original understanding
when we interpret the Speech and Press Clauses, just as we do when we read the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment.”).
67. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3038–42 (plurality opinion).
68. Id. at 3035–36.
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Amendment.69 To decide that question “we must decide whether the right
to keep and bear arms is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty,”70
or “whether this right is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.’”71
The differences between the kinds of arguments that Justices Thomas and
Alito make shape the history that is relevant to each. Justice Thomas wants
to know what the adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment meant. Therefore
his focus is on adoption history and the meaning of “Privileges or
Immunities of Citizens of the United States.” Justice Thomas does not care
what other generations of Americans thought about the right to bear arms
except to the extent that their views elucidate the understandings of the
adopting generation.
Justice Alito, by contrast, relies on the authority of judicial precedent.
He therefore uses history in two different ways. First, he looks to the
history of doctrinal development to derive the proper test. Second, he
applies a doctrinal test that asks a historical question. The doctrine asks
whether there is a longstanding tradition of treating a right as fundamental.
If so, and if the Court has not previously decided the question to the
contrary (that is, in the history of precedent), the right is protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As he puts it: “Unless
considerations of stare decisis counsel otherwise, a provision of the Bill of
Rights that protects a right that is fundamental from an American
perspective applies equally to the Federal Government and the States.”72
Justice Alito therefore endeavors to show that the right to keep and bear
arms has long been regarded as fundamental. He canvasses attitudes at the
Founding, during the early nineteenth century, and during Reconstruction
leading up to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.73 He argues
that framers of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that the right to bear
arms was fundamental.74 But Justice Alito does not care that the adopters
would not have understood the right in the same way as a modern court.
The adopters would likely have considered the right to keep and bear arms
as a right of citizens protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. But
the Supreme Court long ago relegated that clause to irrelevance. Beginning
in the early twentieth century, it began asking whether a right is
“incorporated” into the Due Process Clause.75
69. Id. at 3036.
70. Id. (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
71. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
721 (1997)).
72. Id. at 3050.
73. Id. at 3036–42.
74. Id. at 3040 (noting that the thirty-ninth Congress’s “efforts to safeguard the right to
keep and bear arms demonstrate that the right was still recognized to be fundamental”); id. at
3041 (“In debating the Fourteenth Amendment, the 39th Congress referred to the right to
keep and bear arms as a fundamental right deserving of protection.”).
75. As Randy Barnett shows, when Justice Alito briefly mentions the views of framers
like John Bingham and Jacob Howard about the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, he
states that they believed that the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole, rather than the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, protected the right to bear arms. Barnett, supra note 14, at
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An important weakness in Justice Alito’s argument—which does not
apply to Justice Thomas’s—is that Justice Alito does not carry his story
forward into the twentieth century. Having established that the right was
viewed as fundamental in 1868, he pronounces it deeply rooted in the
nation’s traditions, and stops his historical inquiry. Nevertheless, although
the views of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adopters may be good evidence
that a right has long been regarded as fundamental, they cannot establish
that proposition by themselves. Suppose, for example, that public attitudes
that the right is fundamental faded away in the late nineteenth century
because of concerns about political radicals, labor activists, and
immigrants,76 that states and the federal government began to regulate arms
regularly,77 and that the modern movement for gun rights did not begin in
earnest until the second half of the twentieth century.78 Rather than always
being deeply rooted in our nation’s traditions, the right’s importance to
Americans has oscillated throughout history. This history would tend to
undermine Justice Alito’s doctrinal argument that there is a longstanding
tradition of viewing the right as fundamental, but it would have little effect
on Justice Thomas’s inquiry into original meaning.
Even when Justices Alito and Thomas focus on the same period of
history—Reconstruction—they see different things. Justice Thomas asks
whether the right to bear arms is a privilege or immunity of national
citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or
Immunities Clause. He tries to show that the adopters meant to protect
portions of the Bill of Rights through that clause,79 and he describes how
early Supreme Court decisions like the Slaughter-House Cases80 and
United States v. Cruikshank81 distorted the framers’ design.82 Modern case
law now uses the controversial doctrine of “substantive due process” to
incorporate fundamental rights into the Due Process Clause; but this clause,
427 (accusing the plurality of “bowdlerizing its sources to read that the right to bear arms
was protected by the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole, rather than
by the Privileges or Immunities Clause in particular”); see also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at
3033 n.9.
76. Cf. Gerard N. Magliocca, Why Did the Incorporation of the Bill of Rights Fail in the
Late Nineteenth Century?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 102, 124 (2009) (“[E]nthusiasm for extending
the substantive protections of the Bill of Rights to the states evaporated during the 1890s
because of the sharp increase in agrarian radicalism and labor protests.”).
77. See David B. Kopel & Clayton Cramer, State Court Standards of Review for the
Right To Keep and Bear Arms, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1113, 1157 (2010) (“In the
twentieth century, gun control ceased to be a peculiar Southern institution. Fear of labor
unrest and massive waves of immigrants, as well as the emigration of Southern blacks,
brought gun control north. Many gun control laws were upheld, and many others were not
even constitutionally questioned.” (footnote omitted)).
78. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism
in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 207–12 (2008) (noting that the modern movement for gun
rights began in the 1970s).
79. McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3062 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“This Court’s substantive
due process framework fails to account for both the text of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the history that led to its adoption . . . .”).
80. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
81. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
82. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3060–63.
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Justice Thomas explains, concerns substance, not process.83 Adoption
history shows that the Court’s precedents have betrayed the Constitution’s
original meaning, creating a “jurisprudence devoid of a guiding
principle.”84
Justice Alito finds these aspects of history irrelevant to his purposes. His
source of authority is not original meaning, but past precedent: “For many
decades,” he explains, “the question of the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment against state infringement has been analyzed under
the Due Process Clause of that Amendment and not under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.”85 And that settles the matter. Whether or not the
Supreme Court has strayed from the adopters’ views, Justice Alito explains,
it will “decline to disturb” its previous rulings.86 Where Justice Thomas
sees a betrayal of the original understanding, Justice Alito merely sees a
line of precedents to be followed.
VI. THE ROLE OF CULTURAL MEMORY: ARGUMENTS FROM NATIONAL
ETHOS, POLITICAL TRADITION, AND HONORED AUTHORITY.
Perhaps the most interesting and complicated use of history occurs in the
last three modalities of argument: arguments from national ethos, political
tradition, and honored authority. As I shall point out in the next section,
these arguments often strongly shape how lawyers use adoption history in
constitutional construction.87
Although superficially similar to arguments from custom on the one
hand, and appeals to political convention and institutional settlement on the
other, arguments from ethos and tradition claim a different kind of
justification. Arguments from national ethos and political tradition appeal
to what is honorable about American values, as judged from the standpoint
of the present. These are arguments about national character, national
values, and the retrospective meaning of political and historical events.
Arguments from ethos and tradition are often framed in terms of sweeping
narratives, canonical events, and cultural heroes.
Arguments from tradition claim that our traditions constitute our political
life and offer normative direction to our endeavors. Arguments from
national ethos claim that a constitutional interpretation that betrays the
deepest meanings of America’s values and political traditions cannot be
correct. Finally, arguments from honored authority claim that we should
follow the model and the views of honored figures from our nation’s past
because (1) they represent important national values and norms; (2) they are
central to or constitutive of important and valuable American traditions; or

83. Id. at 3062 (“The notion that a constitutional provision that guarantees only ‘process’
before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could define the substance of those
rights strains credulity for even the most casual user of words.”).
84. Id. at 3062.
85. Id. at 3030–31 (plurality opinion).
86. Id. at 3031.
87. See infra Part VII.
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(3) their actions and beliefs display wisdom, courage, or other political
virtues.
Because traditions are shaped and sustained over long periods of time
and because new traditions can arise throughout the nation’s history,
arguments from ethos and tradition may invoke many different periods in
American history, not just adoption history. Moreover, arguments from
political tradition and national ethos may reach different conclusions than
arguments from original meaning, intention, and understanding because we
only know what the country means and what its central values are in
retrospect, through an interpretive and narrative construction judged from
the standpoint of the present. (Of course, people who view the Framers
through the lens of contemporary concerns may not notice this difference,
leading to anachronisms.) Our present-day conclusions about the meaning
of America and its values may not have been obvious or uncontroversial to
everyone at the time of adoption. Some features of the American
experience which we see as central today were unknown to or would have
been rejected by the adopting generation.
For example, because of the work of successive waves of social
movements for equality, most Americans believe that equality and
opposition to racism are central to the American creed. But many people in
1787—or even 1868—might not have seen it the same way. The American
political tradition as it has developed may reshape or even reject the
principles and values we derive from original meaning, original
understanding, or original intentions. Nevertheless, as I shall point out in
the next section, many arguments that people call “originalist” are better
understood as appeals to ethos, tradition, and honored authority.
Arguments from ethos and tradition address fellow members of the
political community in the present by invoking the normative meaning of a
shared past. They interpret the meaning of the past in order to demonstrate
appropriate action in the present and the future. Thus, arguments from
ethos and tradition claim authority in constitutional argument because of
contingent facts about the speaker and audience. They presume that both
the speaker and the audience identify with a common tradition, that the
identities of both are partly constituted by that tradition, and therefore that
both speaker and audience wish to continue to be true to it. People owe
allegiance to a political tradition because it informs their way of
understanding the world and it shapes their views of how and why aspects
of social life should be valued and continued.
Note that these assumptions may be unfounded. If people do not identify
with the country’s traditions, arguments from ethos and tradition will have
little purchase. If people do not look up to venerated figures as models of
value and behavior, arguments from honored authority will carry little
weight. A distinctive feature of American constitutional culture, however,
is its quasi-religious veneration of American political traditions and
especially its Founders—not necessarily as they were understood in the past
or in their own time, but as they are understood in the present.
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Arguments from ethos and tradition are related to arguments from social
custom and political convention, but they have a different focus and flavor.
Arguments from social custom assume that the people as a whole have
settled upon a set of mores that reflect mutual adjustment, solve
coordination problems, and economize on collective wisdom. Arguments
from political convention assume that political actors have settled on
permissible courses of conduct that all relevant actors have either consented
or acquiesced to; the authority of these conventions comes from mutual
consent and/or continuous practice.
Arguments from ethos and tradition may draw on these mechanisms, but
their concern is quite different. They often focus on particular individuals
and events as symbols of political values; they emphasize great deeds and
great struggles, cultural heroism and cultural villainy, and narratives of
progress, decline, restoration, and redemption. They explain the meaning
of key events like the Civil War or the New Deal. Nevertheless, arguments
from ethos and custom can overlap. In American mythology, the common
individual can be—and often is—a cultural hero, and important figures
from history can symbolize the cumulative actions of many people over
long periods of time. Similarly, political settlements can be imbued with
the authority of myth and symbol as well as convention.
Moreover, appeals to ethos, tradition, and honored authority should not
be confused with arguments for maintaining the status quo. Appeals to
social custom or political convention usually argue for retaining some
version of the status quo, even if the nature of the status quo is disputed.
But arguments from ethos, tradition, and honored authority work quite
differently. Lawyers’ invocation of tradition need not be Burkean—it
might be revolutionary. When Americans invoke the traditions of the past,
they may be offering jeremiads or narratives of decline. They may call for
restoration and return. Or they may urge the present to return to the
wisdom and instruction of a forgotten past, newly excavated.
Appeals to the Founders, Framers, and adopters are often made in order
to contest the way things are currently being done, and to urge people to
return to a better, purer, or more authentic version of American norms and
values. Movement conservatives, for example, made originalist appeals
beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They sought to overthrow
what they saw as the liberal status quo under the banner of a return to
original intention, and later, a return to original meaning. In response,
liberals during the late 1980s and early 1990s looked to Founding-era
traditions of civic republicanism to promote progressive reforms.88
Movement conservatives were hardly the first to use originalism as a
technique of constitutional revolution. In his study of the use of history in
judicial opinions through the Warren Court era, Alfred Kelly noted that
appeals to the Founding were often used as a “precedent-breaking” device
that allowed judges to sweep away old doctrinal structures and put new

88. The story is told in KALMAN, supra note 1, and Kalman, supra note 1.
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ones in their stead under the guise of preserving continuity.89 That is why,
Kelly explained, liberal justices from the 1940s onward—and especially
during the Warren Court era—so often used adoption history to justify their
revolutionary opinions.90 They invoked older American traditions to
explain why they were abandoning newer ones.91
Although we now tend to think of the Warren Court as the enemy or
opposite of originalism, citations to the Framers, Founders, and adopters
actually increased during the Warren Court years.92 The reason is simple:
the liberal justices of the New Deal/Civil Rights regime were engaged in
constitutional transformation. After adopting a philosophy of judicial
restraint during the New Deal, liberal justices had to justify continuing the
use of judicial review to protect new kinds of civil rights and civil liberties,
to discipline state and local police forces, to outlaw prayer in the public
schools, to reform the voting system, and to protect African Americans and
the poor. To overturn scores of precedents and remake the constitutional
status quo in the image of legal liberalism, liberal justices needed a source
of authority beyond precedent. They found it in adoption history.93
Conservatives learned the same lesson when they, in turn, began to attack
the work of the Warren Court in the name of the Framers, Founders, and
adopters. But unlike liberal legal reformers, the conservative movement
made the idea of Framers’ intentions and original meaning central to its
cause. Conservatives were so successful in opposing “originalism” to
“living constitutionalism” and using originalist arguments to attack legal
liberalism that people today forget how often appeals to the Framers were a
staple of Warren Court living constitutionalism. Indeed, Kelly’s famous
89. Kelly, supra note 1, at 125–26.
90. Id. at 131 (“In search of some adequate guiding principle upon which to support
their libertarian interventionism in the social order, the reformist activists on the Court
initiated a new era of historically oriented adjudication.”); see also BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 35, at 56 (explaining that Justice Hugo Black’s turn to
text and history allowed him “to restore to judicial review the popular perception of
legitimacy which the New Deal crisis had jeopardized”).
91. See AMAR, supra note 33, at 198 (explaining that the reason why the Warren Court
overturned so many precedents is that it was returning to “the deepest ideals of the written
Constitution”). Justice Black, the most famous liberal originalist, exemplified liberals’ turn
to history both before and during the Warren Court era; indeed, in Bruce Ackerman’s words,
he is “the original originalist on the modern Supreme Court.” Ackerman, supra note 29, at
1799; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1221,
1242 (2002) (arguing that Justice Black was the true intellectual leader of the Warren Court).
92. See FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 136–43 (2013)
(collecting statistics). Cross notes, for example, that the Warren Court used The Federalist
“more than any previous Court [in] American history,” although usage increased even
further in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts’ years. Id. at 136; see also id. at 92–96
(describing use of adoption history in Warren Court school prayer, reapportionment, and
criminal procedure opinions). The regular and frequent use of adoption history in Supreme
Court opinions began with the Warren Court, not the conservative courts that succeeded it.
Id. at 96.
93. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 130–31. The justices flirted with the idea of using an
appeal to the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to justify overruling Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896). Finding the historical record inconclusive, they eventually settled on
social science as the precedent-breaking device. Kelly, supra note 1, at 142.
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critique of “law-office history” is an attack on liberal Warren Court
originalism, not the conservative originalism of Robert Bork and Antonin
Scalia. Years later, as movement conservatives gained power and influence
in American law, historians would level similar charges of law-office
history at conservatives.94
A. Invoking Cultural Memory
Arguments from ethos and tradition use history in distinctive ways. A
characteristic example is Justice Louis Brandeis’s concurrence in Whitney v.
California.95 Justice Brandeis argues that government should not be
permitted to punish seditious speech unless it poses a “clear and present
danger.”96 He appeals to the values and beliefs of the American
revolutionaries, and argues that we should remain faithful to these values
and beliefs today:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State
was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the
secret of liberty.97

The courage to risk social disruption from political dissent, Justice
Brandeis explains, is a central and honored American value:
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They
did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of
liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of
free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular
government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and
present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it
may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion.98

Although Justice Brandeis’s appeal looks like an argument from original
intention, it is really an appeal to American ethos and tradition, drawing on
features of American cultural memory. Note that Justice Brandeis speaks of
“those who won our independence,” i.e., the American revolutionaries,
rather than “those who framed our Constitution.” The two groups overlap
but they are not identical; however, in American cultural memory, the two
groups tend to merge into one. This is a sign that we are dealing with an
argument from tradition or ethos rather than a technical argument about the

94. See Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the New
Boss, Same As the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1098 (2009) (arguing that District of
Columbia v. Heller “is not the triumph of a new methodology, but really just the latest
incarnation of the old law office history—a results oriented methodology in which evidence
is selectively gathered and interpreted to produce a preordained conclusion” (footnote
omitted)); Kalman, supra note 1, at 94–95 (describing historians’ criticisms of Reagan-era
originalism).
95. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
96. Id. at 373–74 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 375.
98. Id. at 377.

2013]

NEW ORIGINALISM AND USES OF HISTORY

677

meaning attributed to the Constitution by its Framers or ratifiers.
Arguments that appeal to the Founders or the Framers as an undifferentiated
whole, or that conflate different generations (revolutionaries, Framers,
politicians of the early federal period) are likely to be arguments from
tradition or ethos.
Arguments from ethos and tradition are similar to what Philip Bobbitt
called “ethical” arguments.99 In Constitutional Interpretation, Bobbitt
suggested that ethical arguments are appeals to “the idea of limited
government, the presumption of which holds that all residual authority
remains in the private sphere.”100 Ethical argument concerns “those
choices beyond the power of government to compel.”101
This account of national ethos is too narrow, and Bobbitt did not mean
for it to be exclusive.102 In any case, one of Bobbitt’s definitions of ethical
argument is much broader: “constitutional argument whose force relies on
a characterization of American institutions and the role within them of the
American people.”103
Many aspects of American political traditions and national ethos do not
concern limited government and the protection of the private sphere; two
obvious examples are the idea of democratic egalitarianism and equality
before the law, which apply regardless of the size of government.
Moreover, some aspects of American ethos and political traditions, like
those implicit in Social Security, the Homestead Act, the National Security
Act, and Medicare, assume the beneficial exercise of government power in
the public interest. Indeed, one of the central motivations for the creation of
the 1787 Constitution was that the current government’s powers were too
limited; government needed to be vigorous in order to protect liberty and
provide security.104 This example shows that what people call American

99. See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 35, at 20 (“This form of
argument denotes an appeal to those elements of the American cultural ethos that are
reflected in the [U.S.] Constitution.”).
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 35, at 162 (“Ethical
arguments arise from the ethos of limited government and the seam where powers end and
rights begin.”).
102. Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1937
(1994) (“I do not in fact think that the commitment to limited government is the only ethical
commitment of the Constitution.”). His original formula was probably influenced by the
context in which Constitutional Fate was written: Bobbitt used ethical argument to
demonstrate the right to abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade. See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE, supra note 35, at 225–38 (arguing that the result in Roe follows from the ethical
principle that a government of limited powers may not coerce intimate acts, which include
carrying a child within one’s body and giving birth).
103. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 35, at 144.
104. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 45–50, 106–10
(2005) (arguing that the Constitution and its enumerated powers flowed from geostrategic
imperatives for a stronger centralized government with ample powers to protect liberty and
security); MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE (2003); RAY RAPHAEL,
CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHS: WHAT WE GET WRONG AND HOW TO GET IT RIGHT 114–23
(2013).
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traditions and American character are often subject to multiple and
contrasting interpretations.
Arguments from ethos and tradition seamlessly combine the descriptive
and the normative. From the nation’s founding, what is fundamental to
American character and political culture has been contested. Moreover,
appeals to tradition are complicated by the fact that consensus in practice
and belief often disappears when we inspect history more closely;
moreover, many practices and beliefs that were once widely accepted and
considered traditional or valuable are now rejected as un-American. To
argue from tradition or ethos, one must make interpretive judgments about
what aspects of American history are central and valuable features of its
traditions and what aspects are peripheral, exceptional, irrelevant, or have
been dishonored or repudiated as time has passed.105 In short, arguments
from political tradition or ethos claim that particular values or beliefs are
characteristic of the nation and its traditions rightly understood; such
arguments are inevitably interpretive and normative. As a result, there is
usually more than one way to characterize political traditions and national
ethos; hence arguments from ethos and tradition are usually available on
either side of a constitutional dispute, just as they are for the other
modalities of argument.
Accordingly, it does not matter for Justice Brandeis’s argument whether
the Founding generation disagreed about protecting politically unpopular
speech, whether some of the Founders were selective in their support of free
expression, or whether some members of the Founding generation actually
wanted to suppress particular dissenters—for example, Loyalists during the
Revolution or supporters of France during the early years of the Republic.
After all, the Federalists who supported the Alien and Sedition Acts did fear
the effect of seditious advocacy.106 It was the Jeffersonian Republicans—
then the political minority—who articulated the need for civic courage.107
And even Jefferson himself was not always a champion of free
expression.108
If Justice Brandeis’s argument is an argument from original intention or
original meaning, it is a pretty bad argument.109 Charitably understood,
105. Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The balance
of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches
are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That
tradition is a living thing.”).
106. See JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS
AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956) (describing the Federalist campaign for the Alien
and Sedition Acts and their subsequent enforcement by Federalist judges).
107. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 n.2 (1927) (quoting Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Elijah Boardman (July 3, 1801), and Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural
Address (March 4, 1801)).
108. See, e.g., Michael P. Downey, Note, The Jeffersonian Myth in Supreme Court
Sedition Jurisprudence, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 683, 684 (1998) (“Jefferson’s myth has enshrined
him as a great advocate of individual liberties, but [in] reality [Jefferson] seems to have been
a more pragmatic, and consequently a more repressive, figure.” (footnote omitted)).
109. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 131 n.50 (criticizing Justice Brandeis’s opinion as “a
prime example of history by a combination of essay, fiat, and revelation”).
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however, Justice Brandeis is using history in a different way than the
originalist model of authority prescribes. If pressed, Justice Brandeis
should have been quite willing to admit that not all Founders—or the
Americans who succeeded them—practiced civic courage. Nevertheless, he
might emphasize, this ideal best represents our aspirations as a people.
Note, once again, that Justice Brandeis is not invoking ethos and tradition
in order to argue against change or to preserve the status quo. Quite the
contrary: he wants the Supreme Court to protect the speech of dissidents,
which the law of his day did not.110 Justice Brandeis uses the cultural
memory of the revolutionaries in order to critique the Court’s existing
doctrine. His use of ethos is reformist or revolutionary, rather than a
defense of existing arrangements. Although appeals to tradition may seem
conservative on the surface, they are often calls for transformation or
revolution. Movements for reform often try to persuade fellow citizens by
appealing to shared premises and widely honored examples.111 If the
speaker believes the country has strayed from the correct path, then a call
for fidelity to ethos or tradition is an argument for change, not stasis.
B. Selection and Simplification
Justice Brandeis invokes a heroic past; he calls upon Americans in the
present to live up to their ideals and to their highest aspirations as
Americans. And he tells his story from a present-day perspective,
describing how matters appear—and what they mean—in hindsight. His
portrait of the past is deliberately selective. He equates Jefferson’s vision
with American values and he treats Jefferson’s Federalist opponents as false
prophets. He identifies with some members of the Founding generation as
reflecting the best in the American tradition and neglects or simply refuses
to identify with others.
These features of Justice Brandeis’s argument are characteristic of
appeals to ethos and tradition. Such arguments assume that history has a
purpose or meaning that vindicates or critiques the present, and points to the
proper direction of action in the future.112 Arguments from ethos and
110. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666–68 (1925) (rejecting First
Amendment claims); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In Whitney itself, the Court
upheld Anna Whitney’s conviction under California’s Criminal Syndicalism Act for being a
member of the Communist Labor Party. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 366–71. Despite his famous
argument, Justice Brandeis’s opinion is technically a concurrence because he believed that
Whitney did not properly raise her federal constitutional objections in the lower courts. Id. at
380 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
111. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD 44, 55–56 (2011) (“An appeal to the past [by social movements] . . . is a way of
convincing others that we should be true to a larger set of common commitments to liberty,
equality, and justice that we have compromised or forgotten.”).
112. Id. at 44 (“Members of the political community [use narrative arguments] in order to
make sense of current controversies and the proper direction of political/legal change.”);
Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement
Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 342–43 (2001) (arguing that history supplies both a
sense of collective identity and “the field of collective experience through which we make
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tradition both explain and invoke the meaning of events in the country’s
history, including normative lessons to be drawn from these events and
appropriate models of behavior. Hence they may sometimes simplify
complex historical events in order to demonstrate how they exemplify key
values or lessons.
Because arguments from ethos and tradition draw meaning from history,
they often take a narrative form. They may employ, either overtly or
implicitly, narratives of progress, decline, restoration, or redemption. They
explain who Americans are by explaining where they have come from and
where they are going. They are arguments about Americans’ deepest values
as symbolized by the struggles, commitments, successes, and failures of the
past.113 They are appeals to a transgenerational subject, “We the People,”
who possess certain traditions, values, and features of character that we
come to understand in retrospect. Arguments from ethos and tradition
attempt to explain the trajectory and the meaning of events in American
history. This trajectory may not be one of progress. Americans may have
missed opportunities, or fallen short of their ideals.
Not surprisingly, arguments from ethos and tradition often treat history
differently than most professional historians; sometimes they purposefully
condense events and smooth over complexities and complications. They
seek to understand the past, not for its own sake, but in the service of the
present and the future. History that explains American values may be
heroic or tragic, but it is always didactic.114
Arguments from ethos and tradition explain the meaning and trajectory
of history, not from the standpoint of the past, but from the standpoint of
the present. That is why these arguments are inherently anachronistic.
People in the past did not know how the future would turn out; therefore
they did not understand themselves or their actions in terms of the
narratives we craft today. The defenders of slavery did not know that they
would lose, and the defenders of abolition did not know that they would
ultimately win. Neither side’s adherents knew what use later generations
would make of them, nor how their story would be represented as part of
the country’s political traditions.

pragmatic judgments about how to realize constitutional commitments and values in
practice”).
113. See BALKIN, supra note 111, at 25–32, 51–60 (explaining and defending the practice
of narrative justification); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term: Foreword:
The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV L. REV. 26, 29 (2000) (arguing that done
properly, textual argument requires understanding the meaning of key events in American
history, and “good historical narrative, in both a broad (epic-events) sense and a narrow
(drafting/ratification) sense, should inform good textual analysis”).
114. Cf. Gordon S. Wood, No Thanks for the Memories, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 13, 2011,
at 40, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/jan/13/no-thanksmemories/ (reviewing JILL LEPORE, THE WHITES OF THEIR EYES: THE TEA PARTY’S
REVOLUTION AND THE BATTLE OVER AMERICAN HISTORY (2010)) (explaining that social
mobilizations like the Tea Party find it important to articulate the normative lessons of
history, even if such groups inevitably understand history in simplified ways, and remarking
that “[m]emory is as important to our society as the history written by academics”).
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C. Culture Heroes and Antiheroes
Arguments from ethos and tradition often feature cultural heroes and
antiheroes, or canonical events that stand for particular values characteristic
of the nation and its people. In mythology, a culture hero is a figure of
legend to whom a people attributes its greatest or most essential
achievements or values.115 Culture heroes often symbolize a people’s
characteristics or aspirations. In China, for example, the legendary
Emperor Fuxi is credited with the invention of writing, fishing, and
trapping;116 in English legend, King Arthur stands for the unification of the
English nation and the value of chivalry.117 Culture heroes are often
demigods or people of elevated rank or status (like kings or emperors); but
they can also be pioneers, inventors, discoverers, or people or groups of
people who endure great hardships and overcome great obstacles.
A culture antihero, by contrast, is a person who embodies values or
achievements that the culture currently rejects (but may once have
accepted). The category also includes people who make a great mistake or
transgression that is important to the culture or defines the culture. Thus,
the same person can be both a culture hero and an antihero; an example
from Christianity is Adam and Eve, who are both the progenitors of
mankind and whose mistake results in mankind’s fall from grace.
In American memory, culture heroes include the Founding Fathers as a
group, and, individually, key figures like George Washington, Benjamin
Franklin, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and Alexander
Hamilton. Culture heroes in the nineteenth century include Abraham
Lincoln, Frederick Douglass, and Susan B. Anthony, and in the twentieth
century, Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King, Jr. Among lawyers, important
figures like Chief Justice John Marshall, Justice Joseph Story, the first
Justice John Marshall Harlan, and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., may
serve as culture heroes. Like other culture heroes, their salience and
prominence may wax and wane over time.
Culture antiheroes include King George III, Chief Justice Roger Brooke
Taney, and Sherriff Bull Connor. Interestingly, the Founding Fathers (and
particularly Thomas Jefferson) also play the role of antiheroes when people
view them as slaveowners or as accommodators of slavery. (Hence, as with
Adam and Eve, people may accuse the Founders of committing America’s
original sin.)118

115. See DAVID LEEMING, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WORLD MYTHOLOGY 88 (2005)
(noting that often the culture hero “establishes the community’s institutions and traditions”).
116. LIHUI YANG, DEMING AN & JESSICA ANDERSON TURNER, HANDBOOK OF CHINESE
MYTHOLOGY 120–21 (2005) (describing the many inventions attributed to Emperor Fuxi).
117. MAIKE OERGEL, THE RETURN OF KING ARTHUR AND THE NIBELUNGEN: NATIONAL
MYTH IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH AND GERMAN LITERATURE 200 (1997) (noting
King Arthur’s use as a symbol of Englishness and chivalry during the nineteenth century).
118. See, e.g., Barack Obama, U.S. Senator, A More Perfect Union (Mar. 18, 2008),
available at http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/hisownwords/ (“The document [the
Framers] produced was . . . ultimately unfinished. It was stained by this nation’s original sin
of slavery, a question that divided the colonies and brought the convention to a stalemate
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Arguments from ethos and tradition pick winners to identify with and
losers to scorn (or even forget), because these people articulated values that
Americans now honor or oppose. People understand culture heroes (and
antiheroes) as such in retrospect; their importance and their reputation may
rise and fall as times change and traditions evolve.
American culture heroes may not have been paragons of virtue in all
respects. They may not have represented a majority of public opinion at the
time they spoke. They may not have been particularly prominent in their
day, or as prominent as others now long forgotten. They may even have
been considered marginal, dangerous, radical, or a threat to American
values in their own time—as Jefferson and his followers may have seemed
to their Federalist adversaries, or as people like William Lloyd Garrison or
Thaddeus Stevens must have seemed to Southern whites in mid-nineteenthcentury America. An argument from ethos might quote the views of
Frederick Douglass and ignore or castigate those of Chief Justice Taney,
even though Chief Justice Taney’s views may have been held by a majority
of the public and Douglass’s were considered “off-the-wall”; and even
though Taney was Chief Justice of the United States and Douglass could
not even be a citizen.119
D. Arguments from Honored Authority
The use of culture heroes and antiheroes in American constitutional
argument produces a special kind of argument from ethos and tradition. I
call these arguments from honored authority.120 If an honored figure—say
Madison, Jefferson, Washington, or Lincoln—expresses or demonstrates a
view about a constitutional question, the argument has greater persuasive
authority simply because the honored figure expressed it or supported it.
That is because one way of being faithful to tradition is to adopt the same
practices or beliefs as a culture hero, who acts as a paragon and as a model
for appropriate action.
When the culture hero does not come from the Founding period, it is easy
to see that the argument is not one of original meaning. But quite often
arguments from honored authority do invoke members of the Founding
generation. In these situations, arguments from honored authority may
resemble and overlap with arguments from original intention, original
meaning, or original understanding. But their claim to authority is different
than the originalist model of authority.
until the founders chose to allow the slave trade to continue for at least twenty more years,
and to leave any final resolution to future generations.”).
119. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 963, 967 (1998) (using an 1860 speech by Douglass as an example of constitutional
interpretation by members of social movements).
120. Michael Dorf calls this style of argument “heroic originalism.” Dorf, Integrating
Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1803. The idea of
honored authorities, however, applies beyond adoption history. See id. at 1811 (“If we
appeal to the Framers because we believe that their unusual place in history as well as their
wisdom make their views especially authoritative, should we not also consult the views of
other historically well-situated, wise actors?”).
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The originalist model asserts that a particular meaning, intention, or
understanding was both fixed and widely shared at the time of adoption.
That is why current generations must follow this meaning, intention, or
understanding today. For example, original meaning originalism considers
legally binding the objective public meaning of the words at the time of
adoption, which presumes a wide and durable consensus on meaning. But
the honored authority’s views or practices may not have been the consensus
view or representative of what most other Founders, Framers, ratifiers, or
citizens believed. On certain topics there may have been no consensus
view; the honored authorities simply offered their opinion or acted based on
their political interests or beliefs. The claim to authority is not that the
honored authority’s views were widely shared in their own time, but that
they are important to our present day political traditions, or otherwise
worthy of emulation. To be sure, people may quote honored authorities in
the belief that their views are a good proxy for those of the adopters in
general, but doing so may confuse salience and honored status with
representativeness.121
For example, Madison’s views on constitutional issues evolved through
decades of public life as he served in multiple capacities and confronted a
wide range of political problems and controversies.122 He and other
Founders—including many of the early Federalists—were often on
different sides of political and legal issues as time passed. Madison freely
offered opinions on constitutional questions later in his life that the adopters
may never have considered or on which there was no generally agreed
view. Nevertheless, statements by James Madison on almost any subject
are treated as having persuasive authority because he is regarded as the
Father of the Constitution. Here again, why we use history matters greatly
to assessing the strength and relevance of particular arguments. Madison’s
views may often not be a reliable guide to original meaning, original
understanding, or original intention, and yet may still be important to us
today because of his preeminent place in American political traditions.
George Washington’s behavior as the first president of the United States
offers a particularly complicated source of authority.
Some of
Washington’s actions as president may have been followed by most or all
of his successors and therefore have the authority of nonjudicial precedent
or convention. In other cases, however, contemporary audiences may look
to what Washington did to elucidate the meaning of executive power today
because of Washington’s symbolic status in American history. Arguments
121. Cf. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 4–14 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic
for Judging Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES, supra, at 163–65 (noting heuristics that confuse salience with
representativeness).
122. See RAPHAEL, supra note 104, at 94–101 (describing Madison’s evolution from the
Philadelphia Convention, in which he argued for the power of the federal government to veto
all state legislation, to the Virginia Resolution of 1798, in which Madison argued for the
power of state interposition).
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that his actions demonstrate the original meaning of Article II may actually
be better characterized as arguments from honored authority, using
Washington as a sort of constitutional paragon and a model for
constitutional virtue. Although Washington was greatly honored and
admired in his lifetime, not all of his contemporaries agreed with everything
he did as president, or would have agreed that what he did fixed for all time
the correct meaning of Article II. Like most political leaders, many of
Washington’s decisions were controversial in his own day and may not
reflect a consensus of meaning, understanding, or intentions. Although his
actions might not be a reliable guide to original meaning, they still might be
important as arguments from an honored authority who holds a central
place in the American political tradition.
E. Selective Identification and Dis-identification
Arguments from ethos and tradition often call for us to remember what
“we”—here a transgenerational subject—fought for, what we stand for,
what we promised we would do, and what we promised we would never let
happen again.123 They explain the meaning of history in terms of what has
been lasting, honorable, and worthy of continuation in our political
traditions. They may do so as a critique of the status quo. One of the most
common forms is the American jeremiad, which asserts a decline or a
falling away from political virtue, and asserts the need for reform and
renewal.124
Such judgments, as noted above, may offer a selective view of history.
They are also selective in another sense. They identify people and ideas
that history has hallowed through time, and people and ideas that history
has judged mistaken. They refer, either implicitly or explicitly, to who was
on the right side of history, as judged from the present, and who was on the
wrong side. Those on the right side should be emulated; those on the wrong
side serve as negative examples. Thus, arguments from ethos and tradition
pick history’s winners and losers, regardless of how these people
understood themselves or were understood by others in their own day.
Arguments from ethos and tradition engage in selective identification and
dis-identification.125 They identify Americans in the present with only
some of the people who lived in the past and only some of the events that
occurred in the past. Equally important, they also dis-identify Americans in
123. BALKIN, supra note 111, at 17, 26, 31 (describing narrative justification’s use of
transgenerational “we” in constitutional argument).
124. SACVAN BERCOVITCH, THE AMERICAN JEREMIAD 7 (1978) (contrasting the European
jeremiad, with its “lament over the ways of the world” and the sins of the people, with the
American jeremiad, which featured a call for action and renewal); Jack M. Balkin, The
Distribution of Political Faith, 71 MD. L. REV. 1144, 1152–54 (2012) (noting the use of the
jeremiad in constitutional and political argument, and identifying the argument of
Constitutional Redemption with “the jeremiad of renewal”); Timothy P. O’Neill,
Constitutional Argument As Jeremiad, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 33, 40–41 (2010) (arguing that
American “constitutional argument has absorbed th[e] structure of the American jeremiad”).
125. BALKIN, supra note 111, at 53–60 (describing processes of selective identification
and dis-identification in constitutional narratives and arguments).
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the present from certain people and events in the past, because those people
and events have proven not to be representative of America at its best, or
exemplify ideas and traits that Americans today should denounce or
repudiate.126
Thus, a contemporary argument about the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act would identify with President Lyndon Johnson and Martin
Luther King, Jr. and his followers, and dis-identify with the police who
rioted on the Edmund Pettus Bridge. An argument about the proper
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment might identify with social
movements for abolition, black civil rights, and women’s rights and disidentify with their opponents, who lost a political struggle over the nature of
America. For similar reasons, people may prefer to quote the views of
those who supported the Constitution rather than their anti-Federalist
opponents. The reason is not because the former had a better insight into
original public meaning of the words in the Constitution than the latter—
after all, both sides spoke the same English language—but because the
supporters were on the right side of history.127
In such arguments, dis-identification is as important as identification.
American constitutional culture includes both a list of canonical cases and a
list of anticanonical cases, like Lochner v. New York,128 Dred Scott v.
Sandford,129 Plessy v. Ferguson,130 and Korematsu v. United States.131 A
familiar form of constitutional argument is to associate one’s opponents
with the positions in these cases, because they were on the wrong side of
history.132
These arguments need not concern adoption history or the Framers. A
good example is the hallowed status that Brown v. Board of Education133
and the civil rights movement have in American political tradition.
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1,134 the members of the Supreme Court fought over the legacy of Brown,
and over who was most faithful to the values of the NAACP and the
members of the civil rights movement who fought for racial equality in the
1950s and 1960s. The issue was whether school districts in Seattle and
126. Id. at 59 (“The stories through which we understand ourselves as part of We the
People create a narrative economy of who ‘we’ are in the story and who ‘they’ are, who we
are rooting for and who we are rooting against, who had wisdom and justice on their side and
who made mistakes (or worse).”).
127. Vasavan Kevasan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1152 (2003) (“The Federalists
won, whereas the Anti-Federalists did not.”).
128. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
129. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
130. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
131. 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see infra note 156.
132. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 111, at 188 (describing use of canonical and anticanonical cases to bestow and withhold authority); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 939–40, 944 (1973) (coining the term
“Lochnering” and comparing Roe to Lochner).
133. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
134. 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (plurality opinion).
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Louisville could assign students by race in order to promote greater racial
integration.135 The plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice John Roberts,
held that they could not, invoking the legacy and meaning of Brown, and
arguing that the school districts were attempting to return to pre-Brown
ideas.136 Justice Thomas’s concurrence emphasized that his approach was
especially faithful to the values and arguments of the plaintiffs in Brown.137
Moreover, Justice Thomas argued, the dissenters and the school board, who
would allow local authorities to use race to promote integration, were like
the people who attempted to defend racial segregation in the public schools,
and who opposed the result reached in Brown.138 (Here Justice Thomas
both identifies with culture heroes and identifies his opponents with the
cultural memory of antiheroes.) Conversely, the dissenters argued that they
were faithful to the legacy of the civil rights revolution and Brown.139
The contrasting opinions in Parents Involved were not simply arguments
about Brown as a legal precedent. Rather, they were arguments about the
meaning of Brown as a central symbol of America’s constitutional
traditions. The arguments in Parents Involved made much use of history,
but not adoption history. Their focus was not on the original meaning of

135. Even the way that the issue is phrased by the plurality and the dissent reflects
contrasting interpretations of Brown. The plurality, understanding Brown as about
colorblindness, sees the issue as “whether a public school that had not operated legally
segregated schools or has been found to be unitary may choose to classify students by race
and rely upon that classification in making school assignments.” Id. at 711. The dissent, by
contrast, explains, “These cases consider the longstanding efforts of two local school boards
to integrate their public schools . . . . [and] to bring about the kind of racially integrated
education that Brown v. Board of Education . . . long ago promised—efforts that this Court
has repeatedly required, permitted, and encouraged local authorities to undertake.” Id. at 803
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 746 (plurality opinion) (“[W]hen it comes to using race to assign children to
schools, history will be heard.”); id. at 747 (quoting the argument of attorney Robert Carter
in Brown that “[w]e have one fundamental contention . . . that no State has any authority
under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in
affording educational opportunities among its citizens”); id. (“Before Brown, schoolchildren
were told where they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The
school districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we
should allow this once again—even for very different reasons.”).
137. Id. at 772 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[M]y view was the rallying cry for the lawyers
who litigated Brown.”); id. at 778 (“What was wrong in 1954 cannot be right today.”).
138. Id. at 773–79 (comparing the dissent to Plessy and noting “similarities between the
dissent’s arguments and the segregationists’ arguments”); id. at 778 n.27 (“The
segregationists in Brown [also] argued that their racial classifications were benign, not
invidious.”); id. (“It is the height of arrogance for Members of this Court to assert blindly
that their motives are better than others.”).
139. Id. at 867 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The lesson of history . . . is not that efforts to
continue racial segregation are constitutionally indistinguishable from efforts to achieve
racial integration. Indeed, it is a cruel distortion of history to compare Topeka, Kansas, in
the 1950’s to Louisville and Seattle in the modern day.”); id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“The Chief Justice rewrites the history of one of this Court’s most important decisions.”);
id. at 803 (“The Court has changed significantly since it decided School Comm[ittee] of
Boston [v. Board of Education, 389 U.S. 572 (1968),] in 1968. It was then more faithful to
Brown and more respectful of our precedent than it is today. It is my firm conviction that no
Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today’s decision.”).
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the Fourteenth Amendment but on the original meaning of Brown and the
struggle over black civil rights.140
Both sides identified with Thurgood Marshall, the NAACP, and the civil
rights movement, and both dis-identified with the defendant school boards
and with the many powerful and influential national politicians who
believed that overturning the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy was a
mistake. Each claimed that they were faithful to Brown and the civil rights
revolution and that the other side had betrayed its principles.
Much of Parents Involved is an invocation of ethos and tradition,
articulating the meaning of history in hindsight, and identifying history’s
winners and losers.
The decision also demonstrates the multiple
interpretations and meanings available to people who call on a historical
tradition. Not only did both sides engage in selective identification and disidentification, but both drew very different lessons about the meaning of
history and the principles that the civil rights movement fought for. For the
plurality and for Justice Thomas, the NAACP’s campaign to overturn
Plessy was centrally about the achievement of a colorblind Constitution; for
the dissenters, it was a struggle to end racial oppression and to achieve a
racially integrated society.141
F. Evaluating Arguments from Ethos, Tradition,
and Honored Authority
Arguments from ethos, tradition, and honored authority are as important
as they are ubiquitous in American constitutional culture. In Part VII, I will
argue that they undergird many uses of adoption history in constitutional
construction. Most originalist arguments in the construction zone are either
themselves appeals to ethos, tradition, and honored authority, or are assisted
by such appeals.
Given their prevalence and importance, how should we evaluate and
critique them? We saw the answer to this question in our discussion of
structural argument in Part IV.142 How we evaluate and critique a
particular use of history flows directly from its background theory of
justification.

140. See Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 203 (2008) (discussing the controversy over the uses of Brown in Parents Involved
and the ways that colorblindness was invoked in the Brown litigation).
141. Compare Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746–47 (plurality opinion) (declaring that
Brown is about prohibiting differential treatment of students because of their race), and id. at
772 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that Brown supports the view of a colorblind
Constitution), with id. at 803, 804 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Brown is about the
achievement of an integrated society and “set[ting] the Nation on a path toward public
school integration.”). Justice Kennedy’s concurrence also argues that Brown reflects a
national commitment to an integrated society. See id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (“This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its
historic commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all
of its children.”).
142. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.

688

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

Arguments from ethos, tradition, and honored authority claim to be
persuasive because (a) interpretations inconsistent with the deepest meaning
of the nation’s history and character cannot be correct; (b) we are embedded
in and constituted by political traditions and therefore should employ them
as guideposts for correct action in the present; and (c) honored authorities
are appropriate models for emulation and sources of wisdom and advice in
the present.
We can critique these arguments in three ways.
1. First, we can challenge the underlying theory of justification implicit
in arguments from ethos, tradition, and honored authority.
(a) An interpretation can only be inconsistent with the meaning of the
nation if the meaning is relatively clear or coherent. The argument assumes
a clear normative meaning and/or lesson of history that does not exist or is
deeply controversial.
(b) The fact that we are embedded in and constituted by political
traditions does not justify following them if they are unjust or outmoded.
Traditions grow by rejecting past practices as much as by following them.
There may be no univocal tradition; the claimed tradition may be an
invented tradition, or a parochial interpretation of a much more complicated
set of practices that are honored in the breach as much as the observance.
Moreover, if traditions are equivocal, indeterminate, or incoherent, there are
multiple ways of following them that are equally valid.
(c) The mere fact that an authority is honored is not a sufficient reason
for emulating the authority’s behavior or adopting the authority’s views.
Multiple honored authorities existed at the same time or different times who
offer contrary examples or advice.
Honored authorities were not
themselves completely honorable in their behavior and values. They are not
particularly wiser or more foresighted than people in other generations or
even the current generation. Their advice and their actions are conditioned
by and limited by the perspective and circumstances of their times and may
not be generalizable to very different situations. Translating their practices,
norms, and advice to our present circumstances is indeterminate. Finally,
we may learn more about our present circumstances from their moral
failings, their compromises with evil and injustice, their lack of wisdom,
and their inability to foresee the future.
2. Second, we can challenge the characterization and application of
national ethos, tradition, or honored authority in the situation before us.
(a) The historical argument does not properly characterize the meaning
of the events of the past and of American character. History has a different
meaning, and American character is different or more complicated. The
argument tells or assumes the wrong narrative; a different story or
counterstory is more appropriate.
(b) The historical argument does not identify the tradition most relevant
to our present circumstances. It mischaracterizes existing traditions,
describes them at the wrong level of generality, fails to note their
complications and exceptions, or misunderstands their proper normative
application to the present.
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(c) The historical argument relies on an authority that is not particularly
honorable or wise, or is not reliable or worthy of emulation on this
particular subject matter. Other authorities are more honorable, wise,
reliable, and worthy of emulation.
3. Third, we can challenge the quality of the history that supports an
argument from ethos, tradition, or honored authority.
(a) The history mischaracterizes the historical narrative, and
oversimplifies the story. The history identifies only with some people and
events rather than others, but other people and events are just as important
to the meaning of history; they show the nation’s limitations, compromises
and failings, or provide lessons equally valuable for the present.
(b) The history oversimplifies the existence, coherence, and nature of
political traditions; sanitizes or obscures their more unsavory features;
erases complications and incoherencies in practice; treats history as leading
up to an imagined moment of realization or fulfillment; fails to note
traditions’ multiple layers, tensions, and continuous evolution; leaves out
important counterexamples; omits the presence of dissenting practices and
countertraditions; and engages in anachronism.
(c) The history misdescribes the actions and beliefs of honored
authorities, mischaracterizes their relevance for the present, unduly sanitizes
them, fails to place their example and their beliefs in the context of their
own time, and fails to note how their behavior and beliefs changed over the
course of their lives, or varied in different contexts. By offering a one-sided
picture of honored authorities, it fails to note how their moral failings,
compromises with evil and injustice, lack of wisdom, and inability to
foresee the future provide equally important lessons for us in the present.
* * *
Note that these forms of critique generally do one of three things. First,
they offer counternarratives. Second, they complicate history. Third, they
draw competing normative lessons from history. These three tasks are
related, and they bring out central features of arguing about history—and
with history—in politics and law.143
The interdependence of history and justification tells us that the form of
legal argument places a perspective on history. It affects how history is
viewed and made salient. Because arguments from ethos and tradition are
looking for something that can be called national meaning, national
character, or national tradition, they will tend to see history as relevant to
the extent that it yields something that can be called ethos or tradition.
Such arguments go into history looking for coherence, determinacy, and
order in a past that may lack these features, or have less of them than the
advocate is searching for. That is one reason, although surely not the only
one, that lawyers’ history tends to wipe away complications and difficulties.
The three-pronged strategy of counternarratives, counterlessons, and
143. Cf. Stein, supra note 1, at 123–27 (arguing that a primary task of historians should
be to destabilize and complicate historical narratives used to support normative conclusions).
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complications offers a corrective to the likely ways that these forms of
argument will shape (and possibly deform) the historical record.
In addition, historical argument is a way of using the past—persons,
events, traditions, and norms—to contend about important values in the
present and assert the proper direction of action in the future. The use of
counternarratives, counterlessons, and complications helps bring the
normative elements of historical use to the surface. They reveal the
normative choices we make in constitutional argument when we invoke
history. Therefore they also make more salient our responsibilities for the
choices we make.
Appeals to ethos, tradition, and honored authority may obscure these
responsibilities by arguing that our proper path is to emulate the past and
submit to the authority of the past. We treat these individuals, institutions,
narratives, and traditions as both theoretical and practical authorities that
give us reasons to follow their example and adopt their reasons as our own.
The point of historical complication, counterinterpretation, and
counternarrative is to reassert our contemporary responsibility for the
choices we make in the present. The idea is not completely to undermine
the value of tradition, ethos, or honored authority in moral and political
judgment. Rather, the point is to demonstrate that there are multiple paths
that could be understood as proper continuations of tradition, or appropriate
ways of continuing and honoring the constitutional project of past
generations. Complication, counterinterpretation, and counternarrative also
help us see that that the failings of the past, the legacy of past mistakes and
injustices, and the limitations of even our most honored culture heroes are
vitally important to making sound judgments in the present.
Such critiques may demystify certain uses of ethical authority, but they
do not eliminate ethical authority itself. They may complicate history so
that tradition seems far more equivocal and multi-vocal, but they do not
eliminate the constitutive power of tradition over people who live within it.
Such critiques bring to the surface what is at stake in our use of history to
persuade each other—that what we are actually doing is fighting about
values, norms, and ethos using the past as a common resource and a
common point of reference. This, once again, is part of what it means to
say that history is a resource and not a command.
Appeals to ethos, tradition, and honored authority should never be an
excuse for incompetent or sloppy uses of history. People sometimes note
the importance of historical myth in public discourse, but there are two
conceptions of myth that are easily confused. One conception of myth is
that which is false; its falsity makes it useful for persuading others. This
conception of myth does not respect the audience, but merely seeks to
manipulate it. The other conception of myth is a story that highlights and
simplifies in order to demonstrate something that is deeply true (or
universal) in the human condition.
Often the job of lawyers is to persuade others who may lack deep
historical knowledge, much less professional historical training. In this
task, lawyers should never make historical arguments that they know to be
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false, misleading, or oversimplified. Didactic history often engages in
narrative construction, simplification, and selective identification, but these
rhetorical devices must always be in the service of helping explain what one
knows to be true to an audience who is thereby better able to understand its
truth. It should never excuse the lawyer from having to address and
respond to factual complications and contrasting interpretations.
Some arguments from ethos, tradition, and honored authority are deflated
when we complicate the historical picture. Others are not. They may
become richer and more complex by absorbing complicating information,
but they need not entirely lose their ability to persuade. What they will
probably become, however, is more clearly about norms and political
visions than purely about historical facts and descriptions. They will be
more clearly revealed as arguments to adopt certain norms because this is
the best way of carrying on American political traditions properly honored
and understood.
VII. HOW LAWYERS USE ADOPTION HISTORY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
I now turn to the use of adoption history in constitutional construction.
How lawyers use adoption history is just a special case of how lawyers use
history generally—in multiple ways through multiple modalities of
argument.
A. Adoption History and the Forms of Argument
It is incorrect to call all arguments from adoption history “originalist.”
Arguments about adoption history need not claim that we should adhere to
the views of Founders, Framers, or adopters. They need not treat the
Founders, Framers, or adopters in a positive light. We might simply want
to understand how their views shaped the later course of political and legal
development.144 Equally importantly, we might treat their views as
outmoded or their practices as negative examples.
Instead, in this Article I will use the term “originalist argument” to refer
to a subset of arguments that use adoption history; namely those that argue
that we should interpret or construct the constitution in a certain way today
because that is how the Founders, Framers, or adopters would have
interpreted it or constructed it. Originalist arguments use adoption history
to argue that the Founders, Framers, or adopters have theoretical or

144. This is one purpose of what Michael Dorf calls “ancestral originalism.” Dorf,
Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1770; see also
Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and
the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 968 (2002) (“By reconstructing the debates that link the
Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, we can identify the institutions, practices and
understandings that have played a key role in controversies about women’s status in our
constitutional order.”).

692

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

practical authority for us today, and that we should follow their views or
understandings or emulate their practices.145
Defined in this way, originalist arguments cross-cut the distinction
between interpretation and construction. A relatively small number of
originalist arguments concern the content of the basic framework—original
semantic meaning, generally recognized terms of art, and necessary
inferences from background context. They use history to show the
minimum requirements of constitutional fidelity. Most of the arguments
that people generally think of as “originalist,” however, do not concern
these basic elements; they fall in the zone of constitutional construction.
Moreover, unlike arguments about the basic framework, they do not treat
the views or understandings of Founders, Framers, or adopters as
mandatory, in the way that the originalist model of authority assumes.
In constitutional construction, originalist arguments generally assert that
the Founders, Framers, or adopters have special status or special insight
with respect to one or more of the modalities of constitutional argument.
Note that other uses of adoption history might also claim that the Founders,
Framers, or adopters have a special status in the American political
tradition, but not necessarily a positive status or one that we should emulate
today. This is especially so, for example, in discussions of slavery and its
consequences for constitutional structure. Originalist arguments, by
contrast, claim that the Framers, Founders, or adopters have a special status
that is positive or worthy of our emulation. The kind of special insight or
status depends on the underlying modality of argument.
Accordingly, there are eleven different ways that lawyers might use
adoption history in constitutional argument:
1. The Founders, Framers, and adopters had special insight into the
generally accepted meanings of the words and phrases in the text at
the time of adoption (arguments from text);
2. The Founders, Framers, and adopters had special insight into the
likely consequences or the justice of particular constructions
(arguments from consequences);
3. The Founders, Framers, and adopters had special insight into the
meaning and application of judicial precedents (arguments from
judicial precedent);
4. The Founders, Framers, and adopters had special insight into
longstanding interbranch conventions (arguments from interbranch
convention);
5. The Founders, Framers, and adopters had special insight into
longstanding social customs (arguments from social custom);

145. Generally speaking, theoretical authorities give us reasons to believe something,
while practical authorities give us reasons to do things. JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY
AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON (2009); JOSEPH
RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979). The originalist
theory of authority treats Framers and adopters as possessing both theoretical authority about
the meaning of the Constitution and practical authority about how we should apply it.
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6. The Founders, Framers, and adopters had special insight into natural
law and natural rights (arguments from natural law);
7. The Founders, Framers, and adopters had special insight into the
purposes behind the Constitution as a whole and its individual
provisions (arguments from purpose);
8. The Founders, Framers, and adopters had special insight into
constitutional structure and into how the Constitution and its various
parts should function (arguments from structure);
9. The Founders, Framers, and adopters had special insight into, or are
particularly representative of, the nation’s character and values
(arguments from national ethos);
10. The Founders, Framers, and adopters had special insight into or
particularly exemplify our nation’s political traditions, and they are
powerful symbols of these traditions (arguments from political
tradition); or
11. The Founders, Framers, and adopters are honored authorities whose
views are valuable to us today because of who they were and the role
they played in the formation of our country’s political institutions
(arguments from honored authority).
FIGURE 3: THE USE OF ADOPTION HISTORY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

Note once again that there is no separate modality of historical argument;
instead adoption history is available to support each style of justification.
The persuasiveness of these eleven kinds of arguments depends on the
plausibility of claiming—with respect to a given mode of argument—that
the Founders, Framers, or adopters actually have special insight or special
status. The claim is more likely to be plausible for some modalities than
others; hence we should expect that lawyers using adoption history will
predominantly employ these modalities of argument. Equally important,
the claim of special status or insight is more likely to be persuasive only
with respect to some Founders, Framers, and adopters. That is because not
all of the adopters of the Constitution and its various amendments enjoy the
same prominence in American cultural memory or the same ethical
authority in American political traditions.
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B. Persuasiveness and Ethos
Start with modalities nine, ten, and eleven. These are arguments from
ethos, tradition, and honored authority. These are arguments in which an
appeal to Founders, Framers, and adopters is likely to be the most
persuasive. Even though the nation’s political traditions have constantly
evolved—both before and after the Founding—the Founding generation is
often seen as marking the beginning of American political traditions, and
therefore serves as a potent symbol of these traditions. (Colonial history is
imagined as leading up to or culminating in the Founding.) The Founders
are also among the most hallowed symbols of American values and
American national character. Finally, the Founders are among the most
salient and the most honored authorities in American political memory.
Note that I have just spoken of “Founders” rather than of constitutional
adopters generally. The authority of arguments from ethos, tradition, and
honored authority is a function of how cultural memory gets constituted.
For example, at present, the Founding generation—and particular
individuals within that generation—enjoy special authority in American
cultural memory, while later generations, even when they adopt important
amendments to the Constitution, have much less. The framers and adopters
of the Twenty-Second Amendment, for example, are mostly forgotten
today. Even the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments—including
John Bingham, Thaddeus Stevens, Lyman Trumbull, William P. Fessenden,
Charles Sumner, and Jacob Howard—have remarkably little ethical
authority given the importance of these amendments, and are known today
mostly to specialists. Indeed, among the general public the Confederate
General Robert E. Lee is probably better known and more admired. The
reason has nothing to do with the comparative importance of their
respective contributions to the Constitution. Rather, it is due to the cultural
Downplaying the importance of
memory of Reconstruction.146
Reconstruction to America’s constitutional culture helped assuage tensions
between Northern and Southern whites after the Civil War.147 For many
146. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, John A. Bingham and the Story of American Liberty:
The Lost Cause Meets the “Lost Clause,” 36 AKRON L. REV. 617, 620 (2003) (“[F]or years
our national story largely ignored our second group of framers who gave the nation the new
birth of freedom in the post–Civil War amendments.”); Tom Donnelly, Our Forgotten
Founders: Reconstruction, Public Education, and Constitutional Heroism, 58 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 115 (2010) (noting lack of attention to Reconstruction-era founders in public
education).
147. See DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY
2 (2009) (describing the “story of how the forces of reconciliation overwhelmed the
emancipationist vision in the national culture, how the inexorable drive for reunion both used
and trumped race”); PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 61–68 (1999) (noting how
Supreme Court opinions since the Civil War have portrayed Reconstruction and downplayed
its egalitarian and transformative aspects); Robert Meister, Forgiving and Forgetting:
Lincoln and the Politics of National Recovery, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS:
GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 135, 163–64 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999); Norman W.
Spaulding, Constitution As Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the
Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 2033 (2003) (“Respect for state
sovereignty (and the twin theory that the War was fundamentally about preserving the
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years historians in the Dunning School, and those they influenced, treated
this crucial period of political reform as mistaken and corrupt.148 Only
Abraham Lincoln, who was assassinated before the drafting and adoption of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, is widely regarded as a culture
hero today.
1. The Founders and the Ethical Trifecta
The Founders, Framers, and adopters have disproportionate power over
American political imaginations because of the way that American cultural
memory has been constituted. Americans have a story about how they
became a nation. In this story, the American state (the United States of
America), the American nation and people (“We the People”), and the
American Constitution are born at virtually the same time. Through an act
of revolution, the American people brought themselves into being and
created a state and a Constitution under which they still live.
This is a fiction, of course, because from 1776 to 1781 the American
government (such as it was) was the Continental Congress, and from 1781
to 1789 the country was governed by the Articles of Confederation. But
these events are collapsed in American cultural memory. Contemporary
Americans do not understand the Articles of Confederation as America’s
First Republic, and the 1787 Constitution as the Second Republic. Instead,
Americans think of the Articles—if they have heard of them at all—as a
sort of trial run for the real Constitution—the Constitution of 1787.
Most other countries—even those with a revolutionary tradition like
France—do not imagine their state, their people, and their Constitution as
born together. The French nation and the French people long predated the
French Revolution, and France has had many constitutions. It is on its Fifth
Republic and counting. Canada has many cultural affinities to the United
States, but its cultural memory is completely different. It does not have a
revolutionary tradition, and Canadian nationhood and the Canadian
Constitution emerged in phases, beginning with the 1867 British North
America Act, which was passed by the British Parliament, and not by “We
the Canadian People.”
Because Americans remember their state, their national identity, and their
Constitution as roughly simultaneous, they imbue the Founding generation
(which they identify correctly or incorrectly with the revolutionary
generation) with enormous symbolic power. We might call this the “ethical
trifecta”: Americans think of the same group of people as responsible for
creating the American state, the American nation and the American
Constitution, and certain Founders who had key roles in the process, like
Washington, Jefferson, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and Hamilton have

Union) thus became a powerful, publicly acceptable, and legally authoritative framework for
expressing the rather perverse desire to abandon the principles of equality implicated in the
War for the sake of reconciliation with southern whites.”).
148. See Donelly, supra note 146, at 142–43 (describing the Dunning School’s influence).
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taken on mythic status. We return to them again and again for wisdom and
example.
2. Adoption History and Memory Entrepreneurs
Arguments from ethos and tradition trade on what Americans (and
American lawyers and judges) remember, and how they remember it. But
cultural memory—and the pantheon of American culture heroes (and antiheroes)—is not forever fixed. It changes over time, due in part to cultural,
political, and demographic changes, and due in part to people’s efforts at
framing and shaping memory. What we remember and how we remember
it depends on what has happened in the interim and what people before us
have decided it means. During the course of the twentieth century the
Founding generation—and particular members of that generation—became
ever more prominent and central to American cultural memory. The rise of
the conservative movement and conservative versions of originalism in the
second half of the twentieth century, if anything, enhanced these tendencies.
Cultural memory is not like a bank account so that the more one draws
on it the less one has. Quite the contrary: the act of invoking the past is a
way of reinforcing and reinscribing memory—as well as reinterpreting it.
Thus, arguments from ethos, political tradition, and honored authority both
rely on the existing configuration of cultural memory in America and may
also attempt to reframe or reshape it. Remembering, invoking, and arguing
in the name of the Framers, and claiming that they stood for one thing
rather than for another helps produce—and reproduce—American political
traditions and cultural memory.
Just as we speak of “norm entrepreneurs,” who argue in favor of
particular norms in society, we might also speak of “memory
entrepreneurs.”149 Memory entrepreneurs emphasize the meaning and the
importance of past events and the ethical authority (or villainy) of particular
figures; they also attempt to associate these heroes and villains with
particular norms and principles.
Arguments from adoption history participate in the practice of memory
entrepreneurship. The repeated practice of making these arguments—and
the development of multiple resources for learning about, studying from,
and quoting certain figures from the past—may add to the ethical authority
of particular Founders, Framers, and ratifiers. It may make some parts of
world history and American history more salient and important than others.
The recent proliferation of online resources for studying the Founding
period and the proliferation of books, articles, and essays about the
Founders, far from exhausting their authority, may serve to enhance it.
149. See ELIZABETH JELIN, STATE REPRESSION AND THE LABORS OF MEMORY 33–34
(2003) (“[M]emory entrepreneurs . . . seek social recognition and political legitimacy of one
(their own) interpretation or narrative of the past.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf.
Gary Alan Fine, Reputational Entrepreneurs and the Memory of Incompetence: Melting
Supporters, Partisan Warriors, and Images of President Harding, 101 AM. J. SOC. 1159,
1159 (1996) (“Reputational entrepreneurs attempt to control the memory of historical figures
through motivation, narrative facility, and institutional placement.”).
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Even the practice of contending over the significance and positions of
certain Founders, Framers, and adopters can add to their ethical authority,
because it signals their importance in the wider political culture.
C. How Ethos, Tradition, and Honored Authority Interact
with Other Modalities of Argument
Next, consider modalities seven and eight. These are arguments
from structure and purpose. These are the arguments in which appeals to
adoption history are likely to be most persuasive, and therefore most often
employed. What the Founders, Framers, and adopters believed, thought,
assumed, or intended is likely to be especially salient and important.
As I noted previously, arguments from structure and purpose need not be
arguments from original meaning, original intention, or original
understanding. Nevertheless, most American lawyers—and, indeed, most
Americans—accept that members of the Founding generation have special
insight into the Constitution’s point or purpose, and special insight into how
its various parts were designed and should function together. That is so
even if some of their assumptions may have become outmoded by
intervening events. Here too, the authority of the Founders, Framers, and
adopters is buttressed by the rhetorical authority of their place in the
nation’s political traditions.
Matters become more complicated with modalities two to six. These are
arguments from consequences, judicial precedent, interbranch convention,
social custom, and natural law. In these situations arguments from adoption
history may also rely implicitly on the ethical authority of the Founders,
Framers, or adopters.
The Founders, Framers, and adopters might have special insight into the
meanings of judicial precedents of their own era, but they are not a
particularly good guide to the proper application of judicial precedents that
were decided years after their time. In fact, lawyers and judges are likely to
cite to the Founders, Framers, and adopters in order to justify departing
from existing precedents. In this way, lawyers and judges can claim that in
breaking with precedent they are maintaining a deeper continuity.150
The Founders, Framers, and adopters are unlikely to have special insight
into the consequences of constitutional interpretations in a future they could
know nothing about. On the other hand, people might believe that these
honored authorities have special wisdom about institutional design or
special insight into what is just and unjust. Moreover, with sufficient
rhetorical preparation, lawyers might invoke the Founders in
consequentialist arguments. We can make the Founders’ views persuasive
by describing their predictions or their judgments of political cause and
150. Thus, Alfred Kelly, in his critique of the Supreme Court’s use of history, pointed out
that judges have often engaged in extended historical essays as “a precedent-breaking
instrument, by which the Court could purport to return to the aboriginal meaning of the
Constitution. It was thus able to declare that in breaking with precedent it was really
maintaining constitutional continuity.” Kelly, supra note 1, at 125.
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effect selectively or in general terms so that they apply to us today.151 Or
we can cherry-pick those predictions or causal judgments that turned out
roughly correct while ignoring those that have turned out to be wildly
inaccurate or irrelevant.
The Founders, Framers, and adopters are unlikely to be particularly
persuasive authority about the content and application of longstanding
interbranch conventions, at least if the claim is we should follow existing
conventions because they reflect the longstanding practice of many
generations of actors. Many of these conventions began after the
Founders’, Framers’, or adopters’ time; others may have begun
contemporaneously but evolved significantly later on.
Nevertheless, the views of the Founding generation might have
persuasive authority if we stipulate that conventions have not changed at
all; in that case, their views stand for the entire tradition of practice and we
invoke their understandings because of their distinctive status as honored
authorities. We also might invoke the Founders’ views about interbranch
relations in order to argue for a change in current conventions, or to argue
for a return to original understandings. Advocates of congressional war
power who do not like the growth of executive power in the twentieth
century might call for a return to the assumptions of the Framers or the
early federal period. Note that these are better described as structural
arguments that invoke the ethical authority of the Founders or their special
insight into purpose and structure rather than arguments for following
existing conventions. Here again, recourse to the Founders is a way of
breaking with tradition or settled practice in the name of a deeper
continuity.152
For similar reasons, the Founders, Framers, and adopters will rarely offer
particularly persuasive authority about the content or application of
longstanding social customs. These customs may have begun long after
their deaths or may have evolved significantly since their day. We might
argue for a return to or a restoration of the (imagined) mores of the
Founding generation, despite intervening changes in society. But this is not
151. Consider, for example, Madison’s statement in The Federalist No. 47, “The
accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of
one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 293 (James
Madison) (Gary Wills ed., 2003). A lawyer might quote this passage to criticize a particular
development in the administrative state or in government surveillance practices, even though
(1) the principle applies far more generally, and (2) Madison would not have comprehended
the situation—much less the modern administrative and national security state—in his 1788
essay. By treating the statements of the Framers as general principles, we allow ourselves to
wrench them out of their historical contexts and apply them to contemporary situations.
152. For a pronounced example of how original meaning trumps tradition, see Noel
Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 502–03 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861
(2013). In Noel Canning, the D.C. Circuit jettisoned longstanding presidential appointment
practices (which had existed since 1921 and 1823, respectively) on the authority of the
original public meaning in 1787. See id. at 502 (“[W]e conclude that practice of a more
recent vintage is less compelling than historical practice dating back to the era of the
Framers.”).
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an argument for following longstanding custom; it is an argument for
reform or revision of longstanding custom based on the ethical authority of
the Founders. Thus, it is better described as an argument from ethos or
honored authority.
The Founders, Framers, and adopters may have special insight into
natural law or natural rights, but it is more likely that key philosophers like
Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, John Locke, or Immanuel Kant have greater
expertise. Nevertheless, the fact that various Founders, Framers, and
adopters believed in natural law and natural rights and spoke in these terms
gives their statements special force in American constitutional argument.153
But this persuasive force comes not from their philosophical expertise, but
from their status as honored authorities or as key figures in the American
political tradition.
Finally, consider the first modality—arguments from text. These can
either be arguments about original meaning, which are questions of
interpretation, or constructions of the text. The latter might include
intratextual arguments, arguments that use text to elucidate structure and
purpose, or arguments from statutory canons of construction.
If the issue is the original meaning of the text, the linguistic uses of the
Founders, Framers, and adopters are perfectly good evidence.
Nevertheless, any competent speaker of the English language during the
same period should be an equally good authority.154 Some arguments from
original meaning do look to dictionary definitions, contemporaneous
newspaper accounts, and correspondence.155 Nevertheless, as Jamal
Greene has pointed out, lawyers and judges often quote texts from the
Founders or Framers—like The Federalist—as evidence of original public
meaning. They do so not because the Founders were more competent
speakers, but because of their ethical authority.156
Similarly, many textual arguments that quote the Founders, Framers, or
adopters are really arguments about their purposes, intentions, or
153. Moreover, to the extent that people identify a timeless common law with the natural
rights of Englishmen, the common law at the time of the Founding becomes a proxy for
natural rights. See Reid, supra note 1, at 211–12 (discussing the theory of the “ancient
constitution” identified with Magna Carta).
154. If the issue is generally recognized legal terms of art, the opinions of any welltrained lawyer or judge of the period should be equally good.
155. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 97 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) (consulting
a dictionary as to the meaning of the word “cruel” in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause); Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause,
55 ARK. L. REV. 847, 856–65 (2003) (examining every use of the term “commerce” in the
Pennsylvania Gazette that appeared from 1728 to 1800).
156. Greene, supra note 1, at 1697. Akhil Amar’s well-known defense of textualism is
largely about the text’s relationship to ethos, tradition, and honored authority. Amar
emphasizes the text’s wisdom, its connection to epic narratives of American history, its role
as a common cultural focal point, and its singular ability to bind the diverse people of the
United States together as one nation. See Amar, supra note 113, at 29–30 (emphasizing that
the text must be understood against epic narratives and great events); id. at 43–45
(emphasizing the comparative wisdom of the text); id. at 47 (“[I]n the Constitution itself, we
can all find a common vocabulary for our common deliberations, and a shared narrative
thread . . . . [T]he Constitution is and should be our national bedtime story.”).
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expectations, or about their views on constitutional structure. Lawyers may
call these arguments from “original meaning,” but in fact they are
arguments from how the Founders, Framers, or adopters would have
constructed the text. As noted above, this kind of argument is familiar in
thick accounts of original meaning.157 In these cases, the textual argument
rests either explicitly or implicitly on the ethical authority of the Founders,
Framers, or adopters or their centrality in the political tradition.
D. The Hybrid Nature of “Originalist” Arguments
A recurrent pattern emerges in our march through the modalities. Many
originalist arguments—that is, arguments from adoption history that treat
the Founders, Framers, and adopters positively or as worthy of emulation—
are hybrids. They may formally be arguments from purpose, structure,
consequences, and so on; but they also rely on the ethical authority of the
Founders or Framers or their special status in the American political
tradition. These originalist arguments appeal to ethos, tradition, or honored
authority in the service of other modes of argument, like text, structure,
purpose, or consequences.
The rhetorical advantage of hybrid arguments is obvious: an argument
about constitutional text, purpose, structure, or consequences becomes more
powerful if a famous Framer also made it or if one can associate it with the
Founders in general. Conversely, one way of critiquing an opponent’s
arguments is by associating them with opponents of the Constitution, with
other cultural antiheroes or with a now discredited or anticanonical opinion
like Dred Scott v. Sandford or Plessy v. Ferguson.158
An implicit or explicit appeal to ethos, tradition, and honored authority is
a characteristic feature of originalist argument in the United States. That
includes both arguments about the basic framework and the vast majority of
originalist arguments, which are in the construction zone.

157. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410–11 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
158. See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 681 (2005) (“Anti-canonical cases serve as examples of
how the Constitution should not be interpreted and how judges should not behave.”); Balkin
& Levinson, supra note 119, at 1018–19 (explaining that the anticanon consists of “cases
that any theory worth its salt must show are wrongly decided” and which help normalize
belief about law); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 384 (2011)
(explaining that anticanonical cases are a device of ethical argument because they
“symbolize a set of generalized ethical propositions that we [as a nation] have collectively
renounced.”); Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J.
243, 245 (1998) (explaining that the anticanon consists of “the set of texts that are important
but normatively disapproved”).
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FIGURE 4: ORIGINALIST ARGUMENT IN
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

These features of constitutional argument are modeled in Figure 4:
adoption history can support each style of justification; and originalist
arguments are often “hybrid,” appealing either explicitly or implicitly to
ethos, tradition, or honored authority.
The distinctive role of ethos, tradition, and honored authority in
originalist argument explains why originalist arguments are so
commonplace in American constitutional culture, and why both self-styled
originalists and nonoriginalists often make appeals to adoption history.
Regardless of their theoretical disagreements, both originalists and
nonoriginalists have a stake in American political traditions, and both
recognize the normative importance and rhetorical force of those traditions
among lawyers, judges, citizens, and government officials in the United
States.
Moreover, the importance of ethos, tradition, and honored authority in
much originalist argument also explains the remarkable mismatch between
the actual practice of originalist argument by lawyers and judges, and the
many contemporary academic theories of originalism. Academic theories
of originalism and the originalist model of authority do not explain why
Americans—including American lawyers and judges—are repeatedly
drawn to adoption history when they argue about the American
Constitution.
Contemporary academic theories generally attempt to ground originalism
on the basis of abstract theories about popular sovereignty, the rule of law,
or the nature of meaning. These theories may offer perfectly sensible
accounts of why lawyers and judges must adhere to the basic framework.
Indeed, the new originalism offers one such account. But the actual
practice of originalist argument in the United States goes well beyond
claims about the basic framework. The way that Americans—including
most American lawyers and judges—make originalist arguments does not
correspond to the assumptions of originalist academic theory. It is heavily
infused with appeals to ethos, tradition, and honored authority. It often
ignores the distinction between interpretation and construction, and casually
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runs together claims about the original meaning of the Constitution with
appeals to the ethical authority of the past.
Jamal Greene has pointed out a curious feature of contemporary
constitutional theory. Today, most originalists are original public meaning
originalists. They argue that what is binding on later generations is what
the words of the text would have meant to the general public. As Greene
notes, originalists converged on this theory because of theoretical
difficulties with earlier forms of originalism that looked to the intentions of
the Framers and the understandings of the ratifiers.159
However, if the relevant question is what the text meant to a member of
the lay public, contemporary dictionaries, newspapers, and private
correspondence should be just as authoritative as the statements of Framers
and ratifiers.160 Moreover, the use of a particular word or phrase by an
159. See Brest, supra note 1, at 213–17 (noting difficulties that the Framers themselves
did not recognize intentionalism as a valid form of argument; that there may not be a original
intention or understanding on a wide range of certain questions, that intentions and
understandings may have differed among the relevant adopters, that intentions and
understandings may be indeterminate, or that they cannot be made determinate “unless those
intentions are understood at a level of generality too high to give practical guidance”);
Greene, supra note 1, at 1687–88 (citing Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 611–12, 620 (1999)); Powell, Original
Understanding, supra note 1, at 886–88; see also Baade, supra note 1 (noting that general
acceptance of arguments from intention appear well after the Founding period); Caleb
Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 585–86 (2003)
(noting that a theory of original understanding “has trouble handling disagreements among
the ratifiers about the meaning of the Constitution . . . . [I]t is hard enough to identify
consensus interpretations within a single state’s convention. The difficulties are only
magnified when one tries to identify consensus interpretations across different states” that
ratified at different times in the debate).
160. See Barnett, supra note 159, at 621–22 (stating that critics of originalism mistakenly
“expect to see a richly detailed legislative history only to find references to dictionaries,
common contemporary meanings, and logical inferences from the structure and general
purposes of the text”); McGowan, supra note 1, at 757 (“On the public-meaning theory, The
Federalist is no more than a topical equivalent of Samuel Johnson’s dictionary or any other
usage guide, and the theory cannot distinguish the writings of Hamilton and Madison from
those of any literate hack of the day.”).
Justice Scalia offers a similar theory in the Tanner Lectures, although he appears to
conflate original public meaning with original understanding:
I will consult the writings of some men who happened to be delegates to the
Constitutional Convention—Hamilton’s and Madison’s writings in The Federalist,
for example. I do so, however, not because they were Framers and therefore their
intent is authoritative and must be the law; but rather because their writings, like
those of other intelligent and informed people of the time, display how the text of
the Constitution was originally understood. Thus I give equal weight to Jay’s
pieces in The Federalist, and to Jefferson’s writings, even though neither of them
was a Framer. What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a
statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra note 17, at 38.
Using the example of a private 1788 letter from a clergyman to a farmer, (neither a
Framer or adopter) Vasavan Kevasan and Michael Stokes Paulsen agree that the everyday
linguistic usage of ordinary citizens “is at least competent evidence of original meaning,
notwithstanding its purely private nature.” Kevasan & Paulsen, supra note 127, at 1146. On
this account, however, sources like The Federalist are not markedly superior. See id. at
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opponent of the Constitution should be just as authoritative as usage by a
proponent.161 Yet this does not appear to match the practice of American
constitutional lawyers. Citations to The Federalist and to Madison’s notes
of the Philadelphia Convention are among the most frequently cited forms
of adoption history; Greene has shown that they have become even more
widely cited in the period in which originalist scholars moved to theories of
original public meaning.162
Moreover, The Federalist and Madison’s notes are not entirely reliable
sources of either original intention or original understandings.163 They may
not reflect a consensus either of the ratifiers or of the general public.
Indeed, in some respects they may not even represent Madison’s,
Hamilton’s or Jay’s own views.164 The essays in The Federalist were
1156–57 (“We should read The Federalist because those essays show the meaning of the
words of the Constitution, in context, to ordinary readers, speakers, and writers of the
English language, reading a document of this type, at the time adopted.”).
Nevertheless, Kevasan and Paulsen go on to explain why familiar sources like The
Federalist, the state ratifying conventions, and Madison’s notes should nevertheless have
greater authority than the correspondence of ordinary citizens. They are, among other
things, “an excellent topical concordance” of words and phrases in the Constitution. Id. at
1147–48. In addition, they provide “second-best sources of original public meaning” which
nevertheless are “not constitutive of meaning, and hence binding determinations of meaning
in their own right.” Id. at 1148–49.
161. See Greene, supra note 1, at 1693 (“As evidence of the objective public meaning of
the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is not obvious why [the Anti-Federalist] Brutus’s view—
that it gives Congress ‘virtually unlimited power’—is any less reliable than Hamilton’s or
Madison’s.”); id. at 1694 (arguing that if proponents of the Constitution are cited more often
than opponents, “it is not because opponents are somehow less knowledgeable about the
contemporary meaning of words or have less access to prevailing public wisdom”).
162. See id. at 1691 (“From 1986 to 2002, according to Professor Melvyn Durchslag, the
Supreme Court referenced The Federalist in forty-two percent more cases (ninety-eight
cases) than during the preceding sixteen years, with Justice Scalia writing nearly one-fifth of
those opinions.” (citing Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Supreme Court and the Federalist
Papers: Is There Less Here Than Meets the Eye?, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 243, 295,
297 (2005))); id. (“The Federalist was cited more often in the nineteen years from 1980 to
1998 than in the eighty previous years combined.” (citing Ira C. Lupu, Time, the Supreme
Court, and The Federalist, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1324, 1328 (1998))); id. (“Justice Scalia
cited to the Convention debates in eight Supreme Court opinions from 1986 to 2009, and
Justice Thomas did so in seven opinions from 1991 to 2009. For each Justice, that number
of citations is the highest of any member of the Court during that Justice’s tenure.” (citing
Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Convention, 27 J.L. & POL.
63, 70–71 (2011))); see also id. (“The Federalist and Farrand’s Records are the two most
significant sources of original understanding in our constitutional tradition. The Supreme
Court . . . has referenced The Federalist in 236 opinions from 1965 to 2005 alone.” (citing
Pamela C. Corley, Robert M. Howard & David C. Nixon, The Supreme Court and Opinion
Content: The Use of the Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RES. Q. 329, 330 (2005))).
163. See Greene, supra note 1, at 1694–95 (listing various problems with these sources).
164. See RAPHAEL, supra note 104, at 114–23 (noting that Alexander Hamilton’s essays
probably did not reflect his own views on a number of subjects). Madison, who had strongly
opposed the compromise that gave the small states equal votes in the Senate, was
nevertheless required to defend it in The Federalist No. 62. Madison had wanted a stronger
national government than the convention ultimately produced, and he had repeatedly pushed
for a national power to veto all state legislation. He even expressed to Jefferson his fears
that the new government might fail without the powers he sought for it. Id. at 84–90; Letter
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 24, 1787, in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, ch. 17 document 22 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000),
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propaganda pieces directed at the New York ratifying convention. It is not
clear that they had much influence on the outcome of that convention.165 It
is even less clear that they had much influence on the other state ratifying
conventions.166 As Ray Raphael has explained, “Publius’s first five essays
were reprinted in an average of eight papers outside of New York State, but
after that out-of-state publication fell off dramatically.”167 In fact, “[a]fter
The Federalist No. 16, no essays were printed in more than one paper out of
state.”168 And “following The Federalist No. 23, the remaining sixty-two
essays never made it across New York’s borders at all, except for an excerpt
from The Federalist No. 38 in the Freeman’s Oracle, published in Exeter,
New Hampshire.”169 Although reprints of speeches and essays about the
Constitution “were customary at the time, . . . Publius’s last seventy essays
stand as anomalies, the least likely pieces to have appeared in more than
one state.”170
In addition to publication in newspapers, a collection of the essays in The
Federalist was printed in two volumes, the first (containing numbers one
through thirty-six) appearing in March 1788 and the second in May
1788.171 But it is very unlikely that the two-volume set influenced the state
ratifying conventions. The “initial printing of this now-famous work was
only 500 copies, and ‘several hundred’ of these were still unsold in the fall
of 1788, after the Constitution had been ratified.”172 Moreover, the first
volume was not published until six states had already ratified.173
Madison’s notes of the Constitutional Convention also have weaknesses
as evidence of public understanding—much less public consensus—at the
time of adoption. They were not made public until many years after the
ratification of the Constitution, and therefore could not have influenced the

available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch17s22.html. Nevertheless, in public, Madison lauded the careful balance of federal and state powers in the new
Constitution and emphasized the states’ retention of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 39
and The Federalist No. 45. RAPHAEL, supra note 104, at 89–91.
165. See RAPHAEL, supra note 104, at 112 (noting that by the time New York voted, New
Hampshire and Virginia had already ratified). Moreover, “[f]ollowing The Federalist No.
21, only one of the remaining sixty-four essays appeared in any of the state’s papers north of
the city.” Id. at 275 n.23; see also John P. Kaminski, New York: The Reluctant Pillar, in
THE RELUCTANT PILLAR: NEW YORK AND THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 71–
72 (Stephen L. Schechter ed., 1985) (“Despite the significant place The Federalist has
assumed in American political thought, its impact on New York’s reception of the
Constitution was negligible.”).
166. See Rakove, supra note 1, at 1597 (“The Federalist exercised much less influence
over the debates of 1787–88 than did James Wilson’s published speeches to a Federalist
crowd at the Pennsylvania statehouse and at the Harrisburg ratifying convention.”).
167. RAPHAEL, supra note 104, at 111.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 106.
172. Id.
173. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 127, at 1153.
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public debate leading up to ratification.174 They are also quite brief and
leave out most of what actually transpired at the convention.175
To be sure, some original meaning originalists with the courage of their
convictions might argue that these texts should receive no special treatment,
and that lawyers and judges should stick to dictionaries and similar
resources. But for the most part, their suggestions have fallen on deaf ears.
Lawyers and judges continue to cite The Federalist, Madison’s notes, the
ratification debates, letters from and between famous Framers, and so on.176
What explains this curious state of affairs? As Greene points out, the
best explanation is that lawyers and judges are simply using these materials
differently than contemporary originalist theories of original public
meaning assume or prescribe.177 Appeals to The Federalist and to
Madison’s notes do a special kind of work in legal argument. Although
these arguments seem to appeal to original intentions or original meaning,
they are actually forms of ethical argument.178 In the typology offered
above, they are hybrid arguments that appeal in part to national ethos,
political tradition, and honored authority.
The Federalist and Madison’s notes are authoritative for American
lawyers and judges not because they are reliably representative of the
thought of the adopters as a whole, or because they are especially good
sources of the original public meaning of words and phrases appearing in
the Constitution. They are authoritative because of their revered status in
the American political tradition. They are part of America’s political
Scripture. Accordingly, lawyers and judges quote them like Scripture to
establish key principles and ideas in the American political tradition.
What is true of The Federalist and Madison’s notes also extends to other
familiar sources of adoption history: the ratification debates in the state
conventions, and letters and public statements written by key Framers like
174. See Hutson, supra note 1, at 24 (“At [Madison’s] death in 1836, the notes passed to
his widow who sold them to the federal government, which commissioned their publication
in 1840.”).
175. See id. at 34 (“If read aloud, Madison’s notes for any particular day consume only a
few minutes, suggesting that he may have recorded only a small part of each day’s
proceedings.”).
176. See Greene, supra note 1, at 1702 (“[O]riginal intent as such, invoked for its inherent
authority value, has been a significant part of constitutional practice since the beginning of
the republic and remains significant today.”); Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public
Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (2009) (“The idea
that judicial interpretation of the Constitution should be governed by the real subjective
intentions of the human beings who established it as governing law was, for a long time, so
natural as to require no name.”).
177. Greene, supra note 1, at 1696–97 (noting that originalist arguments “are
authoritative not because they specify the semantic meaning of a text, but because they
reflect a set of values that are offered by proponents as uniquely or especially constitutive of
American identity”); McGowan, supra note 1, at 757–59, 825–35 (noting that in practice
original meaning arguments appeal to ethos); Post, supra note 21, at 29 (historical appeals to
Framers are “a characterization of the national ethos”); cf. Dorf, Integrating Normative and
Descriptive Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1770, 1800–05 (describing and
approving of “ancestral” and “heroic” uses of originalism in constitutional argument).
178. See supra notes 21, 175 and accompanying text.
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Madison and Jefferson. (Jefferson, of course, was off in France during the
debate over the Constitution.) Each of these sources has its own drawbacks
and limitations in demonstrating a consensus about intentions,
understandings, or meanings. But that has not stopped American lawyers
and judges, who continue to cite and invoke them with reverence.
There is nothing wrong with such practices, as long as we recognize them
for what they are, and understand the nature of the claims being made. In
constitutional construction, originalist arguments may appropriately invoke
the authority of ethos and tradition. They may call on the memory of
honored authorities and argue that we should emulate their principles,
ideals, and practices. But we should not confuse these claims with binding
commands from the past. When we do so, we give originalist arguments an
authority they do not really deserve. Correctly understood, however, such
arguments still have plenty of legitimate persuasive power. Originalist
arguments exemplify how Americans use the common resources of the past
to argue about the meaning of the present and the appropriate direction of
the future.
This account of originalist argument attempts to explain and vindicate the
use of these arguments by originalists and nonoriginalists alike. Moreover,
it explains several features of contemporary legal practice that most
academic theories of original meaning originalism are far less able to
account for. Indeed, from the standpoint of these theories, what most
people are doing is simply a mistake.
First, lawyers and judges—including originalist judges—continue to
focus not on the original public meaning of the Constitution—i.e., the
linguistic understandings held in common by any competent speaker of
language—but on the views and examples of famous Founders, Framers,
and ratifiers. They also continue to focus on purposes, intentions,
understandings, and goals—on what the Framers wanted and what they
hoped to accomplish. Sometimes this is called an inquiry into “original
public meaning,” but in such cases “original public meaning” is but a fig
leaf for a very different kind of inquiry. Even so, this practice makes sense
if we stop trying to shoehorn it into original meaning originalism. What
gives these arguments their rhetorical power is the special status of the
Founding generation as especially wise people or as culture heroes, or the
special role that the Founders play in inaugurating the American political
tradition.
Second, not all adopters receive the same degree of attention. Some
Framers (like Madison, Jefferson, Franklin, Adams, Washington, and
Hamilton) and some texts (like The Federalist) receive the lion’s share of
attention, while adopters of post-1791 amendments are not quoted or cited
with the same frequency or reverence.179 From the standpoint of the theory
of original public meaning, all adopters—indeed all members of the
179. The recently created Founders Online website, part of the National Archives,
includes the complete papers of these six figures. FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
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public—should be equally important in providing evidence of how the
English language was used at the time of adoption. On the other hand, we
would expect something closer to current practices if originalist argument
mostly concerns what is central to American national ethos or American
political traditions.
Third, conservative original meaning originalists who argue that fidelity
to original meaning offers the only correct interpretation of the Constitution
nevertheless often leaven their theory by making room for nonoriginalist
precedents and for evolving traditions.180 These accommodations make
particular sense if originalist arguments are themselves appeals to tradition
and ethos.
Fourth, even the most vocal opponents of originalism as a general theory
of interpretation nevertheless frequently use adoption history to buttress
their arguments. In many contexts, like the scope of presidential power,
presidential impeachment, or the Second Amendment, living
constitutionalists sound almost indistinguishable from originalists. They do
so not because they are originalists manqué, but because they are good
lawyers, and they know that appeals to adoption history have special force
in American constitutional culture, especially when there are not very many
judicial precedents to argue from.181 Again, this practice would make
particular sense if most originalist arguments are in the construction zone
and are appeals to ethos, tradition, and honored authority.

180. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of
Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 273 (2005) (arguing for “a strong theory of
precedent in constitutional law” even when it might conflict with originalism because “it
would promote judicial restraint.”); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 794 (2010) (“Unless we are prepared to condemn our existing
constitutional practice as illegitimate, the propriety of other modes of argument besides
originalism, particularly those based upon precedent, must be acknowledged.”); Scalia,
supra note 13, at 861 (“[A]lmost every originalist would adulterate [the theory] with the
doctrine of stare decisis.”); Scalia, supra note 17, at 139–40 (defending use of nonoriginalist
precedents as a “pragmatic exception” in the interests of stability); cf. Michael W.
McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald
Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1292 (1997)
(noting the roles of text, original understanding, the presumption of constitutionality,
tradition, and precedent as appropriate constraints on judicial decisionmaking that produce
humility). Other originalists, by contrast, argue that original meaning should generally
control. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 32, at 157–62 (arguing that “a proper consideration,
consistent with the Constitution’s general structure of coordinate branches, should not treat
the Supreme Court’s past constitutional errors as categorically different from the past
constitutional errors of other branches”; nevertheless, liberty-expanding precedents that are
incorrect when decided should survive when there has been popular ratification); Gary
Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 24
(1994) (“[T]he practice of following precedent is not merely nonobligatory or a bad idea; it
is affirmatively inconsistent with the federal Constitution.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 291 (2005)
(“Stare decisis not only impairs or corrupts proper constitutional interpretation. [It] is
unconstitutional, precisely to the extent that it yields deviations from the correct
interpretation of the Constitution!”).
181. Barnett, supra note 14, at 421–22 (noting that lawyers and judges are more likely to
make originalist arguments when they are “writing on a clean slate”).
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E. Why Originalist Arguments Are Defeasible
Perhaps the most important feature of originalist arguments in American
constitutional culture is that they are nonmandatory and defeasible. In
disputes over constitutional construction, lawyers do not always offer
originalist arguments, and originalist arguments are not always accepted.
For example, regardless of the Founders’, Framers’, or adopters’ views,
few lawyers today would bother to argue that paper money, Social Security,
the Americans with Disabilities Act, or the Fair Labor Standards Act are
unconstitutional; that states may prevent blacks and whites from marrying;
or that states may provide that married women lose all of their common law
rights upon marriage. If lawyers did offer these arguments, most judges
would quickly dismiss them.
If originalist arguments asserted binding commands rather than resources
for constitutional construction, lawyers would always cite them as their
most powerful legal arguments and judges would never ignore them. This
is not how American lawyers and judges operate. As we saw in the case of
Parents Involved, none of the justices—including the two originalists,
Justices Thomas and Scalia—focused on the views of the Reconstruction
framers to resolve the issues in the case. Instead, they focused on the
ethical authority of Brown, the early civil rights movement, and the
NAACP’s campaign to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson.182
On the other hand, these practices make particular sense if originalist
arguments in constitutional construction implicitly rely on ethos, tradition,
and honored authority.
First, these aspects of political culture change over time, asserting
continuity with the past while nevertheless rejecting many elements of the
past.
Second, traditions contain variegated elements, so that there is often
more than one way to characterize them and draw normative lessons from
them. In particular, tradition and ethos can be stated at different levels of
generality.183 Constitutional scholars have often argued that lawyers’
ability to characterize original intentions and understandings at higher and
lower levels of generality presents a problem for originalism, because it
makes originalist argument indeterminate, and thereby undermines its
ability to constrain wayward judges.184 But suppose that we view
182. See supra notes 133–36.
183. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (noting
that traditions can be described at various levels of generality and arguing that judges must
“adopt the most specific tradition as the point of reference” in order to avoid “arbitrary
decisionmaking”); J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1615 (1990) (noting that traditions can be characterized multiply,
are constantly in the process of change, and may feature tensions or even inconsistencies
when viewed at different levels of generality); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels
of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1059 (1990) (criticizing
Scalia’s test and arguing that “judges trained in the method of the common law can
generalize from prior cases without merely imposing their own values.”).
184. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1163
(2012) (“If we are allowed to change the level of generality at which we characterize the
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originalist arguments—at least those in the construction zone—as appeals
to tradition and ethos. Then what seemed like a flaw now looks like a
feature. Varying descriptions and levels of generality is precisely how
people invoke traditions and claims about national character.
Claims about tradition are often contestable (1) because past practices are
variegated and not uniform; (2) because the meaning and lessons of
tradition are often best described through generalization (and there is often
more than one way to do this); and (3) because traditions evolve by
discarding or rejecting previous elements of tradition and absorbing new
ones. Traditions, in short, are always breaking away from parts of
themselves, glomming onto what is new, and then redescribing the changes
as always having been part of the tradition, correctly understood.185
Third, if originalist arguments in constitutional construction are appeals
to ethos or tradition, it is entirely reasonable that these arguments would not
be mandatory but would be defeasible. Contemporary Americans will
accept appeals to the values of the Framers, Founders, or adopters to the
extent that they can plausibly identify them with their own values and their
own sense of what is lasting and valuable about American traditions.186
Traditions, however, change over time, and elements and norms that once
were central may later become peripheral or even repudiated. If
contemporary Americans cannot plausibly identify their values or their
understanding of America’s political traditions with the views of the
Founders, Framers, or adopters, they will not regard them as possessing
ethical authority or the authority of tradition; therefore they will not treat
originalist arguments as having special force. Lawyers will not offer them,
and judges will not accept them.
Originalist arguments in constitutional construction appeal to an identity
between the ethos and traditions of the present and those of the past. Only
if we can plausibly identify the ethos of the Founders, Framers, or adopters
with our own will we accept their will as representing our will.187 That is
why arguments from original understandings and intentions are most
powerful in the years immediately following the adoption of an amendment.
It is much easier to identify with the ethos of recent adopters and view them
as representing or speaking for all citizens in the present.188

original understandings, then originalism can justify anything.”); Tribe & Dorf, supra note
183, at 1063 (“Whose intent matters and at what level of generality? No judge can answer
this question without reference to a value-laden, extra-textual political theory.”).
185. See Balkin, supra note 183, at 1615.
186. See Post, supra note 21, at 29 (“[H]istorical interpretation seemingly presents itself
as a self-denying submission to the identity of past ratifiers, . . . [yet] that identity is
authoritative only insofar as we can be persuaded to adopt it as our own.”).
187. Id. (arguing that “the authority of historical interpretation will in significant measure
depend” on our present “identification, [or] a community of interest, with the framers or
ratifiers” so that “‘[t]heir’ consent . . . is ‘our’ consent; they spoke ‘for’ us.”).
188. Id. at 28–29, 40 n.77; see also Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings
Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 209 (2008) (arguing that recent amendments should be
construed according to original understandings out of “respect for democratic
decisionmaking”).
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As time passes, however, these connections become attenuated, because
norms change, conceptions of what is reasonable and unreasonable evolve,
and political traditions mutate, discarding some elements while
accumulating others. Although Founders, Framers, and adopters may retain
their status as honored authorities, we will invoke them only selectively, in
certain contexts, or in abstract or general ways.
People in a democracy disagree with each other about values, about the
content and force of political traditions, and about the meaning and
importance of historical events. This means that not only will people
invoke the Founders, Framers, and adopters selectively, but they will also
disagree about when and how it is appropriate to do so. Some people will
refuse to respect the authority of the Founders, Framers, and adopters in
particular constitutional contexts—like gay rights or the scope of federal
power—while others will find their views very important indeed. People
will quote different Framers for different propositions. They will see
different things in adoption history. Finally, they will reinterpret the views
of the Framers differently in light of contemporary concerns.
Originalist arguments for judicial restraint sometimes have this character.
For example, the generation that adopted the Fourteenth Amendment had
very different views about sex equality than we do today. That is why they
did not think that states had any constitutional obligation to grant what we
would now consider equal rights to married women.189 Most people today
would find these views objectionable. Instead of arguing that these norms
are substantively correct and that we should abide by them today, one might
instead argue that the framers believed that the issue was best left to
legislatures. Thus, even if the law is unjust by today’s standards, the
framers were wise to leave the issue to democratic majorities.190 One could
make similar originalist arguments against protecting rights to
contraceptives, gay rights, and so on. This reinterpretation of the meaning
of the past converts what might be a potentially unpalatable substantive
view about women, homosexuals, or sexual autonomy into a more plausible
view about democracy, judicial restraint, and the separation of powers.191

189. Ward Farnsworth, Women Under Reconstruction:
The Congressional
Understanding, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2000) (“The [Fourteenth] Amendment was
understood not to disturb the prevailing regime of state laws imposing very substantial legal
disabilities on women, particularly married women.”).
190. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[T]o counterbalance the Court’s criticism of our ancestors, let me say a word in their
praise: They left us free to change.”).
191. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(describing the Texas law criminalizing same-sex sodomy as “uncommonly silly” and noting
that he would vote against it if he were a legislator, but arguing that the right to privacy has
no basis in the Constitution).
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F. The Gravitational Force of Living Constitutionalism
on Originalist Argument
More generally, how lawyers and judges use adoption history is shaped
by the constitutional canon and by the current configuration of
constitutional common sense—what kinds of arguments and positions are
currently treated as “off the wall” and “on the wall.”
Some results, doctrines, and institutional adaptations are both canonical
and durable. Examples are cases like United States v. Darby192 and
Wickard v. Filburn,193 and the accompanying New Deal conceptions of
federal power and economic due process. Most well-trained lawyers and
judges will regard these constructions as settled and believe that
maintaining these constructions is important to constitutional legitimacy.
Therefore, they will argue within the logic of these constructions instead of
directly against them.
For example, the lawyers who challenged the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius194 (NFIB) did not argue for a wholesale return to the original
understanding of federal power of the 1790s (even though their opponents
may have accused them of that).195 Instead, the challengers invoked the
Framers as part of a larger argument that the Affordable Care Act was
unprecedented and went beyond the boundaries set by the New Deal and
modern precedents.196 Instead of attacking these canonical and durable
constructions directly on the grounds that they violated the Constitution’s
original meaning, the challengers argued for a more limited conception of
these constructions.197
In general, then, lawyers will tend to offer originalist arguments in
contexts or in ways that do not directly threaten constructions they currently
believe are canonical and durable.198 (Obviously, lawyers may disagree
about what is canonical and durable at any point in time, and therefore what
they feel authorized to challenge will differ accordingly.) Even lawyers
who dislike canonical and durable constructions and want to overthrow
them may invoke adoption history to alter or limit these constructions only
at the margins, with the hopes of chipping away at them gradually. Some
legal academics, for example, believe that the New Deal settlement was a
serious mistake. If legal doctrine and politics change sufficiently, lawyers
and judges may be emboldened to attack New Deal precedents more
directly. If this happened, it would signal that these precedents are no

192. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
193. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
194. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
195. Barnett, supra note 14, at 428.
196. Id.; see also JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
TO OBAMACARE (2013).
197. Barnett, supra note 14, at 428.
198. On the notion of “canonical” and “durable” constructions, see BALKIN, supra note 2,
at 231, 312–17.
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longer durable and their continuation is up for grabs in constitutional
politics.
In sum, lawyers and judges offer originalist arguments, like all other
constitutional arguments, in the context of the current configuration of the
constitutional canon, and the current constellation of canonical and durable
constructions, and the current sense of what is reasonable and unreasonable,
“on the wall” and “off the wall.” Because the constitutional canon and what
people consider reasonable and unreasonable can change, so too may the
way that lawyers and judges invoke adoption history and the views of the
Founders, Framers, and ratifiers.
Randy Barnett has recently described what he calls the “gravitational
force” of originalist arguments in nonoriginalist opinions.199 Barnett points
out that in judicial decisions that are not primarily based on originalist
reasoning, or where originalist reasoning would seem to be completely
irrelevant, judges nevertheless often feel moved or obligated to quote
adoption history or honored authorities from the Founders, Framers, or
adopters.200 For example, Barnett explains that in NFIB, there was a
conflict between two large-scale conceptions of doctrine, what Lawrence
Solum has called the “constitutional gestalt.”201 One vision of doctrine,
held mostly by liberals and establishment conservatives, assumed that
Congress had virtually plenary powers under the Commerce Clause; the
other, held mostly by movement conservatives, argued that although the
New Deal precedents should be retained, they should not be expanded any
further.202 Originalist arguments helped lawyers and judges express this
latter position. To be sure, originalist arguments, taken to their logical
conclusion, would justify dismantling large parts of the New Deal
settlement. But the Framers were not employed for that purpose; instead
lawyers and judges invoked them to argue for a slightly more limited
construction of the constitutional commitments of the New Deal.
Barnett suggests that originalism may play a role in these cases because
judges sense that current doctrine has strayed too far from the original
meaning, and therefore they are trying to compensate—admittedly in small
ways—from doctrine’s massive deviations from the correct interpretation of
the Constitution.203 I do not think this is the best explanation, especially
199. Barnett, supra note 14, at 425–32.
200. Id.
201. Lawrence Solum has introduced the concept of the “constitutional gestalt” to
describe the configuration of normative theories, doctrines, and constitutional narratives in
place at any period of time. Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the
Constitutional Gestalt, 91 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 32–33),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2152653. The configuration of the constitutional
gestalt is the result of the processes of living constitutionalism and it can be altered through
the same processes.
202. Barnett, supra note 14, at 428–29.
203. See id. at 431 (“[T]he powers upheld by the New Deal and Warren Courts violated
the original meaning of the Constitution, and this expansion was, therefore, illegitimate on
originalist grounds. Because of this, any further expansion must be justified, and any
purported justification that would essentially eliminate the enumerated powers scheme in the
original Constitution is unacceptable or improper.”).
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since judges and justices who do not feel themselves particularly bound by
original meaning regularly make originalist arguments.204 Rather, I think
that lawyers and judges—especially lawyers and judges who have no
thoroughgoing commitment to originalism—are simply doing what lawyers
and judges always have done. They are invoking the rhetorical authority of
honored Framers, Founders, and adopters in order to promote their favored
positions in the particular litigation before them. They will not make
originalist arguments or quote originalist sources for positions that they
believe are too “off the wall,” and if they do, judges—who are equally
happy to cite the same Framers, Founders and adopters—will reject their
arguments.
In United States v. Lopez,205 for example, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist quotes The Federalist No. 45 to argue that “‘[t]he powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite.’”206 When the Chief Justice quotes Madison,
however, he is not expressing buyer’s remorse about the New Deal. Nor is
he seriously contending that the powers of the federal government really are
“few and defined” in the sense that Madison himself would have
understood. After all, Rehnquist then goes on to offer three very expansive
tests for the scope of the federal commerce power, all drawn from post–
New Deal doctrine.207 His point is that these tests do not permit the Gun
Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez.208 Rehnquist believes that federal
power, while expansive, and beyond the wildest imaginings of the very
Framers he is quoting, is still not unlimited, and that it should be more
limited than most liberal constitutionalists believe. He quotes the Framers
as authority for that proposition. In Lopez, originalist argument operates as
a rhetorical flourish, not a gravitational mass; it is not pulling Rehnquist in
any direction he does not already want to go.
Similarly, when Chief Justice John Roberts quotes The Federalist No. 45
in NFIB v. Sebelius,209 he is not expressing hidden pangs of regret about the
entire New Deal settlement. Rather, he believes that federal power should
be limited in this context, and he selects quotations from Madison that

204. By way of analogy, secular Jews do not recite Hebrew prayers and engage in
traditional rituals because they hope to emulate their ultra-Orthodox brethren, who they
secretly recognize are the only “real” Jews. On the contrary, just as modern Jewish
traditions do not depend on the imprimatur of ultra-Orthodoxy, the widespread practice of
originalist argument in constitutional construction does not rest on obeisance to the
originalist model of authority. Both the ultra-Orthodox and secular Jewry are the result of
the same forces of modernity; they have simply responded to those forces in different ways.
205. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
206. Id. at 552 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292–93 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
207. Id. at 558–59 (noting “three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate
under its commerce power”).
208. Id. at 559, 567–68 (concluding that the Gun Free School Zone Act does not fit into
any of the three categories).
209. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012).
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argue for limited federal power and hence help him make his arguments.210
They remind his audience about the nation’s political traditions. In the next
case, or the one before, he will turn right around and argue for positions that
would have made the Framers blanch.211
Indeed, it is worth noting that both sides made originalist arguments in
the Affordable Care Act litigation. Opponents of the mandate invoked the
Founders to argue that the mandate was inconsistent with the principle that
the powers of the federal government were limited; therefore any
interpretation that gave the government a general federal police power had
to be incorrect.212 Defenders of the individual mandate pointed to the
structural assumptions in Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan; they argued
that Congress has the authority to solve federal problems that the states are
separately incompetent to solve on their own.213 Neither side’s use of
originalist argument was designed to wreak a wholesale alteration in the
constitutional status quo. Rather, each side sought to invoke the ethical
210. Id. at 2589 (“The Government’s theory would erode those limits, permitting
Congress to reach beyond the natural extent of its authority, ‘everywhere extending the
sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.’” (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison))).
211. In United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010), for example, Chief
Justice Roberts joined an opinion that held, in effect, that because the federal government
could create crimes, it could create a federal prison system for people who violated them,
and because it could create a federal prison system, it could create a federal system of civil
commitment to detain mentally ill persons who had served their sentences but whom no state
was eager to accept.
212. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2589; Brief for Respondent on the Minimum Coverage Provision
at 16, 18, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James
Madison)); id. at 20 (quoting eighteenth-century dictionaries on the meaning of “regulate”);
id. at 32 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton)); id. at 11 (“A power to
regulate existing commercial intercourse is precisely what the framers sought to confer upon
the new federal government. The power to compel individuals to enter commerce, by
contrast, smacks of the police power, which the framers reserved to the States.”); id. at 17
(“The power to force individuals to engage in commercial transactions against their will was
the kind of police power that [the Framers] reserved to state governments more directly
accountable to the people . . . .”); id. at 32 (“[T]he framers were acutely aware of that flawed
argument [that rights guarantees militated against limited federal power] and drafted the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments to guard against it.”).
213. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2615 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“The Framers’ solution was the Commerce Clause, which, as they perceived it, granted
Congress the authority to enact economic legislation ‘in all Cases for the general Interests of
the Union, and also in those Cases to which the States are separately incompetent.’” (quoting
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 131–132 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1967) (1911) (quoting the language of Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan))); see
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra, at 14, 16–17 (original
language of the Virginia Plan); see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2615–16 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing as support for flexible national power to
solve federal problems THE FEDERALIST NO. 34 (Alexander Hamilton); James Madison,
Vices of the Political System of the United States, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 69, 71
(Jack Rakove ed., 1999); Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), in
9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 368, 370 (Robert A. Rutland & William M. E. Rachal eds.,
1975); Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist (Dec. 1831), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 471, 475 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); Letter from George Washington to James
Madison (Nov. 30, 1785), in 8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at 428–29).
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authority of the past to argue for the best way to construct the Constitution
in the present. This is not so much the “gravitational force” of originalism
as the rhetorical power of culture heroes.
In fact, there is a far more powerful “gravitational force” at work. It is
the gravitational influence of the present on the reception and use of the
past. What we think the Framers and Founders meant, when we think it
important to quote them, and what we think important to quote them for,
depend on our present-day views and values, and not on how they saw the
world. The constitutional canon and constitutional culture, which shape the
boundaries of the reasonable and the unreasonable in legal argument, also
shape the contemporary use of adoption history. The constitutional canon
and constitutional culture, however, are the result of the processes of living
constitutionalism. Thus, the more important “gravitational force” is the
influence of living constitutionalism on originalism—the influence of the
constitutional culture on how and when originalist rhetoric is wielded in
constitutional argument. Originalist argument—when, where, and how it is
invoked—is produced by the same forces that construct the living
Constitution generally.214
In his academic novel, Small World, David Lodge describes a character
who writes about the influence of T.S. Eliot on William Shakespeare.215
He does not claim that Shakespeare was actually influenced by Eliot, who
lived centuries later. The point, rather is that our understanding and
reception of Shakespeare is shaped by living in a literary culture that has
already experienced Eliot and literary modernism.216 More generally, we
cannot help but read Shakespeare in the light of the cultural world we now
live in.
A similar phenomenon affects our understanding and use of the
Founders, Framers, and adopters. When we read famous texts from the
Founding today, we immediately connect them to our own constitutional
controversies and anxieties—about the growth of the federal government,
about the increasing power of the presidency, about the dysfunctionality of
contemporary politics, about encroaching invasions of privacy, about the
214. Thus, the gravitational force of originalism on constitutional rhetoric is just the
flipside of the gravitational force of living constitutionalism on the rhetorical practice called
“originalism.” To continue the comparison to physics, what people call centrifugal force is
not really an independent force at all; it is actually the felt effect of centripetal acceleration.
In the same way, the gravitational force of originalism is actually the influence of the
processes of living constitutionalism in constructing how Americans think about their past,
which, in turn shapes what counts as a plausible appeal to Founders, Framers, and adopters
in the present. Or, to use yet another physics metaphor, the acceleration that people call
gravitational force is merely an effect of the curvature of space-time. Contemporary mores
reshape cultural memory—they bend the space-time of history—which, in turn, shapes
contemporary conceptions of how people invoke the past. What we call “originalist
argument” today is the effect of historical change on the reception and normative force of
adoption history.
215. DAVID LODGE, SMALL WORLD: AN ACADEMIC ROMANCE 51–52, 149–50, 197–98
(1984).
216. Id. at 52 (“[W]hat I try to show . . . is that we can’t avoid reading Shakespeare
through the lens of T.S. Eliot’s poetry. I mean, who can read Hamlet today without thinking
of ‘Prufrock’?”).
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influence of money in politics, or about how to preserve representative selfgovernment in a world of growing inequality. Appeal to the wisdom and
example of Framers, Founders, and adopters is an important aspect of how
Americans build out their Constitution over time—how they continue their
intergenerational constitutional project in an uncertain world. Originalist
argument allows us to explain the future in terms of fidelity to the past, yet
it is always a manifestation of the present.
Rather than being opposed to an evolving constitutional tradition, the
ritual citation of Framers, Founders, and adopters is part of that evolving
tradition. Rather than being in conflict with a living Constitution, the
invocation of originalist sources is part of the processes of living
constitutionalism. Invoking the past, and honored authorities from the past,
is often how contemporary reformers call for return, restoration, and
redemption. They seek to modify the constitutional canon in light of
changing times and new political challenges, and when they do, they call on
the Founding generation to support their endeavors, regardless of what the
Founding generation itself would have thought.
Today’s conservative originalists are not the opponents of a living
Constitution; they are the living constitutionalists of the right. If they
succeed, what they will produce is the not the Founders’ constitutional
world and vision, but their own world and vision, a world and vision very
much of the present.217
Indeed, the very idea of “originalist” argument as a distinct species of
argument, and of “originalism” as a distinctive philosophy of
interpretation—is a relative latecomer in American history. It is a product
of constitutional modernity.218 It arises with the new conservative
movements of the second half of the twentieth century.219 To be sure, the
practice of referring to the views of Founders, Framers, and adopters as
ethical authorities occurs throughout American constitutional history.
Before the middle of the twentieth century, however, there was no
systematic or self-conscious attempt to make these rhetorical moves the
most authentic or central examples of constitutional rhetoric. Rather,
lawyers and judges sometimes invoked the Founders, Framers, or adopters
when they felt it was a particularly good argument, and sometimes they did
not. They did not understand that they were under a theoretical obligation
to behave otherwise.
217. And before movement conservatives, Warren Court liberals used adoption history to
justify constitutional transformation. See Kelly, supra note 1 (listing as examples
Establishment Clause, reapportionment, and criminal procedure cases).
218. See Sanford Levinson & J. M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1643–44 (1991) (arguing that the experience of modernity creates a
sense that the past is slipping away, and therefore it creates an urgency to recapture what has
been lost). Note that although this may explain the origins of originalism, one can still
theorize independently about its merits.
219. See Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 554 (describing conservative embrace of
originalism in politics and law beginning in the 1980s); Whittington, supra note 13, at 601
(“It is important to note that originalism was a reactive theory motivated by substantive
disagreement with the recent and then-current actions of the Warren and Burger Courts;
originalism was largely developed as a mode of criticism of those actions.”).
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The characteristic move of originalism in the second half of the twentieth
century is the self-conscious invocation of the Founders, Framers, and
adopters as the touchstone of constitutional legitimacy and as the spearhead
of a movement for political reform. Conservatives opposed fidelity to the
Framers to “living constitutionalism.”
They understood “living
constitutionalism” to be the reigning liberal philosophy. But the actual
processes of living constitutionalism transcend left or right.
Conservative social and political movements and their influence on the
Constitution-in-practice are themselves aspects of a living Constitution.
Movement conservatives wanted to move constitutional doctrine away from
the precedents of the Warren and early Burger Courts in order to better
reflect conservative understandings of constitutional fidelity.
Their
constitutional rhetoric featured narratives of restoration and return that are
characteristic of appeals to ethos, tradition, and honored authority. The
country had strayed from its foundations during the 1960s and 1970s, and it
was necessary to return to the wisdom of the Framers.
The processes of living constitutionalism shape the reception and use of
originalist argument by contemporary Americans on both the left and the
right. Americans use originalist argument in some ways and in some
contexts rather than others because of the legacy of the New Deal, the
national security state, the civil rights movement, the second wave of
American feminism, and movement conservatism.
Contemporary
Americans’ use of originalism is conditioned by political and social
mobilizations that shape American political traditions and normative ethos,
and influence the boundaries of the reasonable and the unreasonable, the
off-the-wall and the on-the-wall. The practice of originalist argument
occurs within these aspects of the American political tradition; it does not
sit outside them and regulate them from beyond.
VIII. CONCLUSION: ORIGINALIST ARGUMENT FOR ORIGINALISTS
AND NONORIGINALISTS
By focusing on the distinction between interpretation and construction,
the new originalism recognizes a broad space for arguments about adoption
history that do not correspond to originalist models of authority. These
arguments operate on multiple levels. Although they may purport to be
solely about original meaning, purpose, or the Framers’ vision of
constitutional structure, they also concern cultural memory and the best
understanding of the American political tradition.
Originalists are hardly the only people interested in these questions.
Nonoriginalists and living constitutionalists also have a stake in the
constitution of America’s political traditions and in conceptions of national
ethos. They have a stake in who is considered an honored authority and
why. They have a stake in the stories Americans tell themselves about their
origins and achievements, and how Americans understand the meaning and
direction of their history. They have a stake, in short, in the nation’s
cultural memory. The point of this Article is not to eliminate the persuasive
authority of arguments from tradition and cultural memory; rather, it seeks
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to recognize them as such and to encourage even those who do not think of
themselves as originalists to understand their appropriate use in
constitutional argument.
In fact, a living tradition of constitutionalism needs the resources of
tradition and cultural memory to work with. These resources are not simply
impediments to change. They are also wellsprings of change. These
resources provide important intellectual tools for people within a living
tradition to understand the challenges of the present, and to argue with their
fellow citizens about the proper direction of the constitutional project in the
future.220
Some nonoriginalists and living constitutionalists may shy away from
invoking adoption history because they fear that this will be seen as an
implicit confession that conservative originalism is the only correct theory
of interpretation. But the rise of a new originalism founded on the
distinction between interpretation and construction shows why these fears
are misplaced. Lawyers engaged in constitutional construction are building
out the Constitution-in-practice. In so doing, they can and should use all of
the available tools of argument and persuasion. Adoption history, and
arguments from ethos, tradition, and honored authority are among those
tools; indeed, in American legal culture, they are often quite powerful tools.
Originalist argument is a characteristic rhetorical feature of the processes of
living constitutionalism; if so, those who call themselves “living
constitutionalists” should certainly avail themselves of it. Arguments from
adoption history and invocations of American culture heroes do not belong
to any sect or party. Appeals to the Founders, Framers, and adopters
occurred long before the rise of modern originalism, and they will no doubt
continue to be offered long after the current configuration of political
argument and academic theory has passed into oblivion.
We should understand the conservative mobilizations of the past forty
years in this light. Like many social mobilizations before them,
conservatives used cultural memory and political tradition to diagnose and
characterize a politics they believed had gone wrong. They used the same
cultural resources to explain how things should change to a wider public.
As noted previously, the arguments that movement conservatives made
were not always conservative in the Burkean sense. Often they proposed
quite radical changes.221 We can and should distinguish between
220. Balkin, supra note 4, at 85 (comparing constitutional change to the oral tradition in
Jewish law and explaining that “[a] living tradition needs memory and resources to work
with, even if it changes over time”).
221. Similarly, although it is now not generally remembered, the Warren Court repeatedly
invoked adoption history to justify many of its revolutionary decisions. Alfred Kelly’s
famous critique of the Supreme Court’s use of “aboriginal” history was written in 1965 and
directed primarily at the Warren Court. Kelly, supra note 1, at 131 (“[T]he reformist activists
on the Court initiated a new era of historically oriented adjudication.”). In his survey of the
Court’s work, the “most important characteristic,” Kelly emphasized, is adoption history’s
“use as part of a process for diverting the stream of established legal precedent.” Id. at 126.
Through its appeal to adoption history, “the Court managed successfully to achieve a
paradox: breaking precedence while rendering obeisance to the doctrine of constitutional
continuity.” Id.

2013]

NEW ORIGINALISM AND USES OF HISTORY

719

movement conservatives’ use of cultural memory and political tradition to
speak to their fellow citizens and the particular substantive values they
sought to promote. We should also distinguish between movement
conservatives’ invocation of cultural memory and tradition and the
jurisprudential claim that the beliefs or understandings of particular Framers
or ratifiers constitute binding law in the present.
Given the interpretation-construction distinction, the practice of making
arguments from adoption history creates no theoretical difficulties for living
constitutionalism. Conversely, living constitutionalists gain no theoretical
points for refusing to engage in originalist styles of argument. All that one
achieves by rejecting these arguments is to limit one’s ability to draw upon
powerful symbols of ethos, tradition, and honored authority.
Tradition and cultural memory are not fixed. They are shaped by how
people choose to argue, articulate, persuade, and remember. They are
shaped by how people actively invest in memory and by how people choose
to remember and encourage others to remember. The pantheon of honored
authorities evolves over time as a result of political and cultural change.
Today Martin Luther King, Jr. is a culture hero; he was not universally so
regarded in 1970. Through politics and through interventions in culture,
different people, groups, and institutions can move in and out of the
pantheon of honored authorities, can gain or recede in salience and
prominence, and can take on different meanings and associations. Even if
the past does not change, memory of the past certainly does. Refusing to
claim the past for one’s self means accepting other people’s versions.
Struggling over tradition and cultural memory is not alien to the idea of a
living Constitution; it is how constitutional politics operates. For the
Founders, Framers, and adopters to maintain their cultural authority, they
must be curated by the present, and continually made relevant to
contemporary needs and perspectives. We must hear them speak to us in
ways that contemporary lawyers and judges can understand and use. We
will not treat them as honored authorities unless we can identify their will
and their norms with our own. It follows then that if the Founders are to
retain their hold over our imaginations, we must constantly reinterpret what
they mean to us. For if the Founders, or some group of them, no longer are
able to speak to us, we will find other culture heroes—Abraham Lincoln,
Susan B. Anthony, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Martin Luther King, Jr., or
Rosa Parks—whose ethical authority better speaks to our political
imagination.
The use of history in constitutional argument is one aspect of larger
struggles over cultural memory and the American political tradition. Living
constitutionalists on both the left and the right are well advised to pay
careful attention to these questions. Indeed, living constitutionalists place
themselves at a disadvantage if they fail to invoke features of our shared
history and traditions in attempting to persuade audiences. Those who will
not deign to speak in the name of tradition and cultural memory will have
tradition and cultural memory deployed against them.

